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Angry White Males: 
The Equal Protection Clause 
and "Classes of One" 
BY TIMOTHY ZicK• 
"'Equal protection' emphastzes disparity m treatment by a State 
between classes of mdividuals whose situations are arguably mdistin-
guiShable. ni 
"[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect 
persons, not groups ."2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
S ection 1 of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proVIdes, m part, that "[n]o state shall . deny to any person withm its Junsdiction the equal protection of the 
• Tnal Attorney, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, United States 
Department of Justice. J.D. 1992, Georgetown Umversity Law Center. The 
op1mons expressed herem are solely those of the author and do not represent the 
position of the United States Department of Justice as to any matter. The author 
would like to thank Colin Owyang and Rupa Bhattacharyya for therr assistance, 
and Madeleme Tiinm for reVIewmg earlier drafts of thiS Article. 
1 Ross v Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (emphasiS added). In Ross, the 
Supreme Court refused to find that the Equal Protection Clause mandated an 
extension of the rule reqwnng states to appomtcounsel for mdigentdefendants for 
appeals as of nght to discretionary state court appeals or appeals to the federal 
courts. Id. at 617-18. 
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,227 (199S). InAdarand, 
the Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action scheme providing financial 
mcentives to pnme contractors who hired subcontractors from certam mmority 
groups, finding that the scheme VIOlated equal protection. I d. The Court noted that 
"all governmental action based on race should be subjected to detailed judicial 
mquuy to ensure that the personal nghtto equal protection of the laws has not been 
mfringed." Id. See also mfra note 224 and accompanymg text. 
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laws."3 Once considered ''the usual last resort of constitutional 
arguments,'~ the Equal Protection Clause has become ''the Court's chief 
mstrument for mvalidating state laws."5 Unfortunately, however, as 
Professor· Tribe has noted, "[t]he words of the equal protection clause do 
not, by themselves, tell us as much as we mght Wish.'>6 Nor does adverting 
to the ongmal mtentions of the framers of the Equal Protection Clause 
proVIde much gmdance, at least as to specific Issues. The "ongmal 
understanding'' of the meanmg of "equal protection" continues to be the 
subject of active scholarly debate, and any effort to glean answers to 
specific questions from the ambiguous ratification debates IS bound to lead 
to frustration. 7 
A13 the Constitution and history offer little gmdance as to the substan-
tive meanmg of"equal protection," it has fallen to the Supreme Court to 
flesh out a doctnne.8 From the begmnmg, the Court has struggled to 
proVIde a coherent framework withm which to analyze challenges to 
governmental action brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. 
From its ongmal requrrement that legislative classifications merely be 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
4 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
5 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concumng). 
6 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514 (2d ed. 1988). 
As Professor Tribe has stated: "To declare that no state shall 'deny to any person 
withm its Junsdiction the equal protection of the laws' ts more to proclrum a 
delphic edict than to state an mtelligible rule of dectston." Id. 
7 Compare Howard J. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 
STAN. L. REv 3, 9-10, 17, 23, 37 (1954), and Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth 
Amendment Reconszdered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 
1054-85 (1956}, and John P Frank & Robert F Munro, The Ongmal 
Understanding of"Equa/ Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 442-
43 (argumg that the Fourteenth Amendment was mtended to eradicate all ractal 
distinctions), with RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-19, 22-23, 
163-65, 169, 173, 239 (1977), and MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF 
PRINCIPLE 170 (1974), and Alexander M. Bickel, The Ongmal Understanding and 
the SegregationDeczszon, 69 HARv.L.REv 1, 12-13, 16-17,46-47,56-58 (1955) 
(argumg that the Fourteenth Amendment was pnmarily mtended to 
constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act and to prohibit ractal discnmmation 
with regard to particular fundamental nghts only). For a summary ofthts and other 
scholarship, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT 2-3, 63, 123 
(1988). 
8 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 148-96. Ongmally, it was antictpated that 
Congress, not federal Judges, would be enforcmg the Fo~enth Amendment See 
CassR. Sunstem, TheAnticastePnnczple, 92MICH.L.REv 2410,2439 (1994). 
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''reasonable," the Court has groped gradually toward its current analytical 
framework under wlnch three (and perhaps more) levels of scrutiny may 
apply, depending pnmarily upon the nature of the group or class allegedly 
discnmmated agamst.9 The current multi-tiered approach auns pnncipally 
to separate permiSsible legislative generalizations based upon group 
charactenstics from illegitimate generalizations based upon stereotypes or 
other Impermissible critena.10 
Notwithstanding the active debate concernmg the ongmal purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause, it IS Widely accepted that the pnncipal aun of 
the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eradicate 
offiCial antebellum discnmmation against blacks, particularly the so-called 
''Black Codes," pursuant to which blacks were treated as a lower or second-
class caste.11 Although not part of the framers' ongtnal design, the Supreme 
9 The Court's ongmal conception of"reasonableness" held that no regulatory 
proviSion was repugnant to equal protection so long as it "place[ d] under the same 
restnctions, and subject[ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who [were] 
embraced by its prohibitions." Powell v. Pennsylvarua, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888). 
For a discusston of the Supreme Court's current multi-tiered approach to equal 
protection, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-66 (2d ed. 1992). Some commentators have argued that 
m addition to the three commonly used standards of review-rational basts, 
mtermediate scrutiny, and stnct scrutiny-the Supreme Court has on occasiOn 
applied a fourth standard, sometimes called "rational basts with teeth." See, e.g., 
Gale Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basrs With Bite: Intennediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name, 621ND. L.J. 779 (1987). At least one Justice contends that there exiSts only 
one standard ofrevtew under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concumng) 
(argumg that the Court IS actually applymg a smgle rational basiS standard mall of 
its equal protection cases). 
10 See ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 9, at 568 ("[T]he court has mcreasmgly 
focused upon the concept of equal protection to guarantee that all mdivtduals are 
accorded farr treatment m the exerciSe of fundamental nghts or the elimmation of 
distinctions based on ImpermiSsible critena. "); see Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, A 
Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and Consrstent with the Best Interests 
of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88 
KY.L.J. 761, 784 n.172 (2000) (highlighting illegitimate legiSlative generalizations 
based upon ImpermiSsible gender stereotypes or other ImpermiSsible critena m the 
child custody context). 
11 See Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concumng) 
("[T]he dnvmg force behmd the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
desrre to end legal discnmmation agamst blacks."); Strauderv West Virginla, 100 
U.S. 303, 310 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment's] rum was agamst 
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Court long ago expanded the nght of equal protection to groups other than 
racial minorities.12 Classifications based upon gender and alienage, for 
example, now rece1ve some form of "heightened" scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13 Yet while the composition of the challenged 
class has shifted from time to time, the conceptualization of equal 
protection as a safeguard agamst disparate treatment of classes of 
mdiVIduals whose situations are allegedly mdistingwshable has remamed 
thecoreprmctple.14 Indeed, m the Court's recent Terms, mterclass conflicts 
such as affirmative action, legislative distncting, smgle-sex military 
education, and anti-gay legiSlation have dommated the equal protection 
docket.15 
discnmmation because of race or color."); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("The ex1stence of laws m the States where the newly 
emanctpated negroes restded, which discnmmated with gross mjustice and 
hardship agamst them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this [equal 
protection] clause, and by it such laws are forbidden."). See John Hamson, 
Reconstructing the Pnvi/eges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1413 
(1992), for an explanation of how Black Codes were used to prevent blacks from 
enjoymg a wide vanety of social and legal pnvileges available to whites. 
12 The Supreme Court has never felt particularly constramed to adhere stnctly 
to the ongmal understanding of the framers of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, 
by the 1960s, only Justice John Marshall Harlan continued to evmce senous 
concern with the Fourteenth Amendment's ongmal understanding. See Harper v. 
Virgmta Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As one 
scholar has noted, the Court m the 1970s "scarcely batted a collective eyelash at 
extending meanmgful equal protection review to groups-women, aliens, and 
nonmarital children-plamly not among the contemplated beneficianes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modem 
Equa/Protection,90MICH.L.REv.213,254(1991).InProfessorKiarman'sview, 
the Justices have generally shown ''vlrtual contempt for the mtegrity of the 
hlstoncal record." Id. at 253. 
13 See Cmg v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender 
must serve Important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.''); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 
(1971) (invalidating state statutes denymg welfare benefits to resident aliens). 
14 In fact, many raciSts dunng the ratification debates agreed with thiS core 
pnnctple. However, these same mdiVIduals attempted to crrcumvent thiS pnnctple 
behmd the Equal Protection Clause by argumg that blacks ''were somethmg less 
than the full equals of whites.'' See NELSON, supra note 7, at 96-97 
15 See United States v. Virgmia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (discussmg smgle-sex 
military education); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (discussmg racial 
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The text of the Equal Protection Clause speaks not of classes or groups, 
but of''persons."16 Does the clause protect persons qua persons, or only as 
members ofidentifiable classes or groups? Is the Equal Protection Clause 
concerned with allegations of indivulual mistreatment at all? While most 
courts and scholars have mterpreted the clause as a protection agamst group 
mistreatment, m Village of Willowbrook v. 0/ech, 17 a little-noticed per 
cunam opm10n, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
may be mvoked to challenge zndivzdual clauns ofnustreatment at the hands 
of government officials.18 Olech mvolved a plamtiff who challenged the 
deciSion of local offic1als to requrre a thirty-three foot easement as a 
condition of connecting property to the mumc1pal water system, while 
requirmg only a fifteen foot easement from other property owners.19 The 
Court treated the question presented--whether a "class of one" smgled out 
for allegedly arbitrary or capncious treatment may bnng a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause-as havmg been plamly decided by its pnor 
precedents. 20 
With the exception of Justice Breyer, who wrote a bnef concurnng 
opwon, 21 the Court brushed aside concerns that had been expressed even 
by Chief Judge Posner, who authored the Olech opwon m the Seventh 
Circuit, that expanding the Equal Protection Clause to cover mdiVIdual 
clalms of miStreatment would flood the federal courts with local disputes 
between citizens and government officials.22 
Pnorto Olech, a split among the federal courts of appeals and, mdeed, a 
split withm one of those cirCUits, had developed concernmgthe VIability of 
"class of one" equal protection clauns.23 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit expressly held in a trilogy of cases, most recently m 
Olech, that an mdiVIdual, regardless of race, gender, ethmcity, or any other 
distinguiShmg group charactenstic, who alleged that a government official 
treatedhnn adversely compared to others similarly situated, due solely to an 
genymandenng); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (discussmg anti-
discnmmation protections for homosexuals); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussmg affirmative action). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
17 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000) (per cunam). 
18 /d. at 1074-75. 
19 Id. at 1074. 
20 Id. at 1074-75. 
21 Id. at 1075. 
22 I d. For a discuss10n of Chief Judge Posner's concerns, see m.fra note 73 and 
accompanymg text 
23 See zn.fra Parts II.A-B. 
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"illegitimate arumus," could bnng a clatm pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.24 Just pnor to Olech, however, the 
Seventh Circuit held exactly the opposite. In a senes of opmons, the Seventh 
Circuit held that "[d]iscnmmation based merely on zndiVldual, rather than 
group, reasons will not suffice" to state a clatm under the Equal Protection 
Clause.25 The Sixth Circuit had also held that so-called "classes of one" are 
not entitled to bnng an equal protection clatm.26 Relymgpnnctpallyupon the 
Supreme Court's equal protection "selective prosecution" case law, which 
requtres that a plamtiff clatm either membership m a protected group or 
viOlation ofanmdependentconstitutionalnghtto mvoketheEqualProtection 
Clause, the Sixth Circuithadheldthat"classes of one" who allege illegitimate 
arumus but who are not smgled out because of membership m a protected 
group or because of retaliation for the exerciSe of a constitutionally protected 
nght do not have a VIable cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.27 
24 See Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), affd per 
cunafn, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000); Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v Indianapolis Bd. 
ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 
(7th Cir. 1995). The First and Second Circuits have also held that the Equal 
Protection Clause protects an mdividual from a state official who selectively 
enforces a law or regulation out of sheer malice. See Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 
47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that claimS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be based 
upon group membership, the exercise of fundamental nghts, or "malicxous or bad 
faith mtentto mJure a person"); Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 
1995) (allowmg selective enforcement claxm based upon "bad faith or malicious 
mtent to mJure," but noting that successful claims should be "infrequent"). 
25 New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th 
Cir. 1990). See also Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 
1995) (holding that personal vendettas agamst mdiVIduals are not actionable under 
the Equal Protection Clause);Albnghtv. Oliver, 975 F.2d343, 348 (7th Cir. 1992), 
aff'd, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (holding that "'the state's act of smgling out an 
mdiv1dual for differential treatment' does not 'itself create the class'" necessary for 
application of the Equal Protection Clause (quoting Wroblewsla v. City of 
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir. 1992)); Smith v. Town ofEaton, 910 F.2d 
1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal protection claxm because plamtiff did 
not allege class-baseddiscnmmation); Huebschen v. Dep'tofHealth & Soc. SeiVs., 
716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that equal protection claim must be 
based on "intentional discnmmation agamst [the plamtiff] because of Ius 
membership m a particular class, not merely [because] he was treated unfairly as 
an mdividual"). 
26 Futerruck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996). 
27 Id. at 1057 In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme 
Court held that a plamtiff may state a claxm for selective prosecution under the 
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In 0/ech, the Supreme Court put aside the Seventh Circuit's ''vindictive 
action" theory and held that a plamtiff need not allege subjective ''bad 
faith," "illegitimate anxmus," or mtent to mJure m order to challenge a local 
official's conduct under the Equal Protection Clause.28 The Court held that 
under its precedents, all that IS requrred to mvoke the Equal Protection 
Clause IS that a plamtiff allege arbitrary treatment, as measured agamst 
others similarly situated.29 The Supreme Court's holding m Olech portends 
the following seemmgly anomalous scenarxo: an mdiVIdual white male, 
who clrums only that a government official has pressed upon him a burden 
not equally shared by others, mvokmg a constitutional proVISion ongmally 
mtended to lift blacks from the second-class caste they occupied after the 
Civil War. According to the Supreme Court, it IS a settled pnnciple that the 
Equal Protection Clause empowers. an mdiVIdual to fight city hall in federal 
court.30 The Court reached this result, however, without even exammmgthe 
text of the Equal Protection Clause, the lnstory leading to its adoption, a 
century of Junsprudence that has m the mam mterpreted the clause to 
prohibit only disparate treatment based upon group or class factors, and 
conflicting language m its own precedents. Indeed, the Court, often 
criticiZed for its lengthy and fractured op1n1ons, devoted little more than 
two pages to tlns Important Issue. The little-noticed per cunam oplDlon 
should serve to create significant confusion m the lower courts. 
Tlns Article contends that the holding m 0/ech was not dictated by the 
Supreme Court's pnorprecedents. Indeed, 0/ech IS contrary to the manner 
m wlnch the Court has lnstoncally mterpreted the equal protection 
guarantee. The op1n1on, cryptic though it may be, will have a significant 
Impact upon equal protection clrums. For example, under 0/ech mdiVIdual 
cnmmal prosecutions, employment decisions, andmnumerablezonmg and 
other local ordinances could gxve nse to an equal protection clrum. 
Part II reVIews the circuit op1n1ons that addressed the smgle-member 
class theory pnor to 0/ech, with emphasis on the Seventh Circuit's recent 
Equal Protection Clause where the deciS1on to prosecute 1s made either m 
retaliation for the exerciSe of a constitutional nght, such as freedom of speech or 
relig10n, or because of membership m a vulnerable group. Id. at 608. See also 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) {holding that selective enforcement 
clauns may be based upon arbitrary classifications). 
28 See 0/ech, 120 S. Ct at 1075. Only Justice Breyer found the presence of 
allegations of bad faith s1gnificant He stated m a concurrmg opwon that the 
"added factor'' of ill will was "sufficient to mlillil11Ze any concern about 
transformmg run-of-the-mill zonmg cases mto cases of constitutional nght." Id. 
(Breyer, J., concurrmg). 
29 Id. at 1074-75. 
30 See zd. 
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case law, as that court has offered the most explicit JUstification for 
bnngmg the vmdictive action cases withm the Equal Protection Clause.31 
Part m analyzes, m broad terms, the "ongmal understanding'' of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Not surpnsmgly, the framers andratifiers did not 
consider, much less settle, whether an mdiVIdual could resort to the Equal 
Protection Clause m cases where government officials allegedly treated 
him arbitrarily. What the framers did establish, however, and what the 
Court had for a century pnor to Olech seemed to accept, IS that the 
pnnc1pal goal of the equal protection guarantee was to prohibit legislation 
that, like the Black Codes, had the effect of creating a subordinate or 
subJugated caste of citizens unequal under the law. Thus, from the 
begmnmg, the Equal Protection Clause was concerned with the legitimacy 
of differential treatment afforded to similarly situated groups of persons.32 
Part IV exammes the Supreme Court's equal protection framework and 
the pnnc1pal theoretical paradigms that the Court's equal protection cases 
have spawned m the academic literature. Notwithstanding occasional 
statements concemmgthe ''personal" nature of the nghts guaranteed by the 
Equal Protection Clause, scholars have noted that the framers' focus on 
illegitimate classifications and subJugation of members of certam groups 
1s the dommant mediating pnnc1ple underlymg the Supreme Court's equal 
protection Junsprudence.33 
Part V concludes that the onginal understandin~ of the equal protection 
guarantee, the Supreme Court's subsequent delineation of the meanmg of 
equality, and the theoretical underpmnmgs of the equal protection 
guarantee do not support extending the Equal Protection Clause to smgle-
member classes who allege differential treatment based upon mdividual 
factors. While ultimately mvolvmg "personal" nghts, m the sense that an 
mdiVIdual always IS harmed or benefitted by governmental action, "equal 
protection" 1s bound up mtrinstcally with the notion of group classifica-
tion-a notion that does not permit the mdiVIdual VIctim of every alleged 
mstance of rmstreatment to invoke its guarantee. The Court's extension of 
equal protection m Olech removes any vestige of a mediating pnnciple 
from the Equal Protection Clause, Imperils the pnnciples of separation of 
powers and federalism, and tnVIalizes the Fourteenth Amendment by 
constitutionalizmg and federalizmg every local dispute between a citizen 
and a government offic1al.34 
31 See mfra notes 36-121 and accompanymg text 
32 See mfra notes 122-51 and accompanymg text. 
33 See mfra notes 152-216 and accompanymg text 
34 See znfra notes 217-310 and accompanymg text 
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Finally, Part VI argues that the allegations m Olech and sunilar cases 
are more properly the subject of the Due Process Clause, m particular its 
substantive component, winch has traditionally been VIewed by the 
Supreme Court as the constitutional proVIsion that protects mdiVIduals 
from arbitrary governmental action. Concerned that the Federal Constitu-
tion could be read to supplant state law, however, the Supreme Court has 
made clear in its substantive due process cases that, with regard to 
executive acts, only conduct that can be smd to "shock the conscience" IS 
subject to constitutional rebuke. Moreover, tlns Article argues that "class 
of one" clmms threaten to supenmpose the federal constitution on state 
administrative law. Thus, if these clmms are to be allowed under Olech, 
they should be subject to the same exacting conscience-shocking standard 
as are substantive due process clmms. Under that standard, only conduct 
that IS arbitrary m the constitutional sense would be actionable under the 
Equal Protection Clause.35 
II. "VINDICfiVE ACTION" AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
In its recent trilogy of ''vindictive action" cases, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the Equal Protection Clause protects a person who alleges that 
a state actor withheld a benefit or enforced a law or regulation out of 
spite or illegitimate animus.36 The First and Second Circuits have also 
embraced the notion that an mdivtdual has a nght under the Equal 
Protection Clause to be free from ''malicious" or ''bad faith" govern-
mental action.37 The Sixth Circuit, feanng that such a ruling would cause 
disputes between local adm1n1strators andcitizensto overwhelm the federal 
courts, has held that a "class of one" cannot mvoke the Equal Protection 
Clause absent one of the crrcumstances Identified by the Supreme Court as 
a basts for a Fourteenth Amendment "selective prosecution" clmm-1.e., 
35 See znfra notes 311-51 and accompanymg text 
36 See znfra Part II.A. While the ''vindictive action" theocy has been embraced 
by different panels of the Seventh Circuit, it IS by no means clear that the theocy lS 
accepted by the entire cirCuit. Esmail and its progeny appear to be m conflict with 
other Seventh Circuit precedent See Herro v. City ofMilwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552 
(7th Cir. 1995) ("A person brmgmg an action under the Equal Protection Clause 
must show mtentional discnmmation agamst hun because oflns membership m a 
particular class, not merely that he was treated unfarrly as an mdiv1dual." (quoting 
NewBurnhamPrameHomesv. VillageofBurnham,910F.2d 1474,1481 (7thCir. 
1990)). 
37 See supra note 24 and accompanymg text 
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a claun of memberslnp in a protected group or VIolation of a constitutional 
nght.3& 
A. The Seventh Circuit Trilogy-The Indivzdual Right to Equality 
The Seventh Circuit's trilogy of''vmdictive action" equal protection 
cases began with Esmail v. Macrane.39 In Esmail, a liquor dealer alleged 
that the mayor of Naperville, Dlinms saw to it that lns application to 
renew a retail liquor license was demed. The dealer obtamed a state court 
order granting the license renewal, then sued the mayor m federal 
court under the Equal Protection Clause, allegmgthat the mayor had forced 
lnm to spend $75,000 m legal fees out of"deep-seated annnosity'' toward 
lnm.40 The mayor's alleged "campmgn of vengeance" was attributed 
pnmarily to the dealer's past success m getting a liquor license revoca-
tion changed to a bnef suspensiOn and the dealer's withdrawal of political 
support from the mayor. 41 In lns complamt, the dealer alleged that the 
city routinely renewed the liquor licenses of others guilty of snnilar, if not 
more senous, mfractions of the law, and derued lns application "for the 
sole and exclusive purpose of exacting retaliation and vengeance" agamst 
Jnm.42 
The distnct court disnnssed the equal protection cause of action for 
failure to state a claun.43 The Seventh Circuit, m an opinion authored by 
Clnef Judge Posner, reversed.44 The court acknowledged that the case did 
not fit mto the two common lands of equal protection cases: those 
mvolvmg "charges of smgling out members of a vulnerable group, racial 
or othel'Wlse, for unequal treatment,'' and those mvolvmg "challenges to 
laws or policies alleged to make rrrational distinctions.'~5 Nor did the case, 
the court noted, fit the usual mode of selective prosecution cases ''where 
the decisiOn to prosecute IS made either m retaliation for the exercise of a 
constitutional nght, or because ofmemberslnp m a vulnerable group.•>% 
Rather, the distinctive feature of the plamtiff's claun was that the unequal 
38 See mfra notes 94-117 and accompanymg text. 
39 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995). 
40 Id. at-178. 
4t Id. 
42Jd. 
43 Id. at 177 
44 Id. at 180. 
45 Id. at 178. 
46 ld. at 179. 
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treatment was alleged to have been the result solely of a vmdictive 
campmgn by the mayor.47 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits government actions taken for illegitimate or wholly :rrrational 
objectives, regardless of whether the VICtim of those actions IS a member 
of a protected group. The court found ample room under the equal 
protection umbrella for ''vindictive action'' clmms brought by mdiVIdual 
plamtiffs.48 The court stated that "[i]fthe power of government IS brought 
to bear on a harmless mdiVIdual merely because a powerful state or local 
official harbors a malignant arumosity toward him, the mdiVIdual ought to 
have a remedy m federal court.'~9 This prmc1ple, the court stated, was 
"implied,50 by the Supreme Court m City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Lzvzng 
Center, Inc.,51 m which the Court held that requmng a special use permit 
for a proposed group home for the mentally retarded VIolated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it appeared to rest solely upon an :rrrational 
preJudice agmnst the mentally retarded. 52 The Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the abuse charged by Esmail was "remote from the pnmary 
concern of the framers of the equal protection clause.''53 Nevertheless, the 
court observed that the clause "neither m terms norm mterpretation IS • 
limited to protecting members of identifiable groups.''54 Indeed, the court 
concluded, "[a] class of one IS likely to be the most vulnerable of all, and 
we do not understand therefore why it should be denied the protection of 
the equal protection clause.,55 
47 Id. at 179-80. 
48 Id. at 180. 
49 Id. at 179. 
so Id. 
51 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
52 Id. at 450. 
53 Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180. 
54 Id. 
ss Id. The court acknowledged that pnor Seventh Circuit precedents appeared 
to hold that a class must have more than one member for discnmmation agamst the 
class to count as a demal of equal protection. Id. But the court noted that other 
crrcuit opmtons had "pomt[ ed] out sensibly that classifications should be 
scrutinized more carefully the smaller and more vulnerable fhe class IS." Id. Indeed, 
Esmail was not the Seventh Circuit's first foray mto the class of one debate. In 
Ciechon v. City ofChlcago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit 
allowed a class of one equal protection clrum to go forward. Ciechon mvolved two 
paramedics Identically responsible for the death of a patient, yet only one was 
disciplined and the city could not provide a reason for the difference m treatment 
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In the second case m the Seventh Circuit trilogy, Indiana State 
Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Board ofSchool Commrss10ners,S6the court 
rebuffed a uruon's effort to mvoke Esmail. The uruon complamed that the 
Indianapolis school board, m the absence of any statutory collective 
bargammg scheme, had signed a succession of contracts withanotheruruon 
to be the exclusive bargammg representative of the school system's non-
teacher employees and would not permit an election for a collective 
bargammgrepresentative. Theplamtiffuruon asserted that the school board 
was thus discnmmating between two sunilarly situated entities m VIolation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school 
board argued that the uruon could not mvoke the Equal Protection Clause 
because it did not allege discnnunation agamst a class.57 The Seventh 
Circuit, agam speakmg through Chief Judge Posner, reaffirmed that 
"[w]hile the pnncipal target of the equal protection clause IS discrumnation 
agamst members of vulnerable groups," a protected class for purposes of 
the Equal Protection Clause may consist of a smgle member. 58 Chief Judge 
Posner wrote: 
The equal protection clause does not speak of classes. A class, moreover, 
can consist of asmgle member.. or of one member at present; and it can 
be defined by reference to the discnmmation itself. To make "classifica-
tion" an element of a dental of equal protection would therefore be 
vacuous. There IS always a class. 59 
The court went on to state that Esmail applies only when the govern-
ment Is treating unequally ''persons who are pnma facie Identical m all 
relevantrespects.•>60 In the case oftheuruons, however, the court concluded 
that the government was ''treatingunequallytwo persons that [were] pnma 
facie unequal in a rationally relevant respect.'>61 On the one hand, there was 
the uruon with which the government had been dealing contentedly for 
many years. On the other, there was the plamtiffuruon, which Wished not 
only to break up the cozy eXIsting relationship, but also to change the 
Id. at522-24. 
56 Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm 'rs, 101 F.3d 
1179 (7th Cir. 1996). 
51 Id. at 1180. 
58 Id. at 1181. 
59 Id. (citations omitted). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1182. 
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means by which a favored umon would be chosen m the future.62 Under 
these crrcumstances, the court held that ''the equal protection clause 1s 
mapplicable because the plamtiff is askmg for a reVISIOn of policy rather 
than for a restoration of equality.'~3 In sum, the court concluded that 
"[t]here IS nothing rrrational or VIciOus aboutprefernngthe known quantity 
to the unknown.'164 
Notwithstanding its assurance that single member classes couldmvoke 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Seventh Circuit warned that not every 
slight suffered at the hands of local government offictals was subject to 
revtew m federal court: 
The concept of equal protection IS trlVIalized when it IS used to subject 
every deciSiOn made by state or local government to constitutional review 
by federal courts. To decide IS to choose, and ordinarily to choose 
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester, 
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest 
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the deciSion 
was arbitrary and an arbitrary deciSIOn treats likes as unlike and therefore 
demes the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the 
Admmtstrative Procedure Act and make its proviSiOns bmding on state 
and local government and enforceable m the federal courts.65 
The court was concerned that the plamtiff umon was requesting that it 
adjudicate a difference of op1n1on as to the appropnate policy the school 
board should follow with regard to its process of labor relations and 
competitive btdding.66 According to the court, reVIew of the school board's 
declSlon for vtolation of equal protection was beyond the purview of 
federal courts, ''which would be operating without any gwdance other than 
what nnght be thought unplicit m the idea of arbitrary governmental 
action.'~7 
In the third case, Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook,68 which ultimately 
made its way to the Supreme Court, a homeowner alleged that the village 
62 Id. at 1181-82. 
63 Id. at 1182. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1181. 
66 See zd. at 1181-82: 
67 Id. at 1181. 
68 Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), ajj'dper 
cunam, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000). 
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of Willowbrook delayed proVIsion of water semces for three months 
because she would not agree to a thnty-three foot easement to permit the 
village to wtden the street, m lieu of the usual fifteen foot easement 
requrred for hookup to the water mam. The homeowner alleged that the 
city's demand for a Wider easement and the associated delay were m 
retaliation for her earlier, successful property damage suit agamst the city 69 
The distnct court dismtssed the homeowner's equal protection chum 
because she did not allege an "'orchestrated campmgn of official 
harassment' motivated by 'sheer malice. '"70 Butthe Seventh Circuit, Chief 
Judge Posner agam writing for the panel, smd that: 
[N]othmg m theEsmail op111lon, however, suggests agenera/requrrement 
of"orchestration" m vmdictive-action equal protection cases, let alone a 
legally significant distinction between "sheer malice" and "substantial ill 
will," if, as alleged here, the ill willis the sole cause of the action of 
wluch the plamtiff complams.71 
It was enough, the court smd, that the city failed for three months to 
perform its obligation to provtde a water hookup "for no reason other than 
a baseless hatred.m2 
Agam, however, the Seventh Circuit votced some reservations with 
regard to the possible consequences of its portentous holdings m Esmail 
and Indiana State Teachers' Ass 'n. Chief Judge Posner wrote: 
Of course we are troubled, as was the district JUdge, by the prospect of 
turrung every squabble over murucipal services, of which there must be 
tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, mto a federal constitu-
tional case. But bear m mxnd that the 'vmdictive action' class of equal 
protection cases requrres proof that the cause of the differential treatment 
of which the plamtiff complams was a totally illegitimate ammus toward 
the plamtiff by the defendant. If the defendant would have taken the 
complamed-of action anyway, even if it didn't have the ammus, the 
anxmus would not condemn the action; a tincture of ill will does not 
mvalidate governmental action.73 
69 Id. at 387-88. 
70 Id. at388 (quoting Esmail v Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
7t Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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The First and Second Circuits have also embracedsmgle-memberclass 
''vindictive action" chums under the Equal Protection Clause. The First 
Circuit allows a plamtiff to establish an equal protection VIolation with 
eVIdence of''bad faith or malicious mtent to mJure."74 While noting that 
vmdictive action cases will be "infrequent"75 and that the malice standard 
should be "scrupulously met,"76 the First Circuit permits such equal 
protection clalills to survive summary Judgment, at least where there IS 
eVIdence of a "malicious orchestrated campaign causmg substantial 
harm.'m Similarly, the Second Circuit has permitted "selective enforce-
ment" of equal protection clalillS where a plamtiff can demonstrate that a 
government official maliciously smgledhlm or her out with bad faith mtent 
to mJure.78 
B. The Opposzng View-One zs Not Enough 
In 1995, the same year Esmail breathed life mto "classes of one" 
allegmg ''vindictive action" under the Equal Protection Clause, a different 
panel of the Seventh Circuit strongly suggested that an mdiVIdual clmmmg 
to be the vtctim of a personal vendetta does not state a cla1I11 under the 
clause. In Hen-o v. City of Milwaukee,19 a disappomted applicant for a 
tavern license filed an action cla1Illmg that hls equal protection nghts had 
been VIolated. The plamtiff alleged that a city alderman acted to block hls 
application out of sheer an1Illosity or preJudice.80 The Herro court 
acknowledged that some "older cases" from the crrcuit suggested that a 
74 Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 1995). 
1s Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 912. 
78 Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1996). Classes of one may 
be entitled to brmg therr equal protection clanns m the First and Second Circuits, 
but to state that a ''vmdictive action" chum Irught ultimately prevail m either the 
First or Second Circuit IS another matter entirely. See, e.g., Rubznovitz, 60 F.3d at 
911 (affirmmg grant of summary JUdgment because evidence of malice was 
msuffi.cient); FSKDrug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirmmg 
8rant of SUIWnary Judgment because evidence of malice was msuffic1ent); 
Verardi's Moody St Restaurant& Lounge, Inc. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 
20-21 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that mdividual defendants were entitled to qualified 
unmunity); LeClaJI v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversmg 
JUdgment for plamtiff at tnai because eVIdence of malice was msufficient). 
79 Herro v. City ofMilwaukee, 44 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1995). 
80 Id. at 551. 
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"class of only one" could state an equal protection claun,81 but stated that 
its "more recent cases place additional burdens on plamtiffs to Identify 
the classification behmd . a 'class of one.' "82 The court suggested that 
plamtiff's clarm would have been stronger had he alleged "a classification 
consisting of all members of the Herro family applymg for new tavern 
licenses."83 In any event, the court held that defendants had offered rational 
reasons for the demal of the tavern license, which was all that the Equal 
Protection Clause requrred. 84 
The "more recent" cases referred to by the Herro court explicitly held 
that a "class of one" could not bnng an equal protection clann. In Smith 
v. Town of Eaton,85 for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that a 
white police officer's clann that his dismtssal VIolated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause "border[ed] on the fnvolous."86 Plamtiff clauned that while 
the town board had Information regarding similar complamts lodged 
agamst two other officers, it did not suspend or dismtss them.87 Quoting 
one of its earlier precedents, the court noted that "[a]n equal protection 
claun must be based on 'intentional discnmmation agamst [the plam-
tiff] because of his membership m a particular class, not merely [because] 
he was treated unfmrly as an mdiVIdual.' "88 As the plamtiff did not allege 
such class-based discnmmation, the court held that his clann could not 
stand.89 
In New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham,90 land-
owners and a developer asserted that the Village ofBurnham's demal of a 
building permit VIolated the Equal Protection Clause.91 The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the plamtiffs' Equal Protection Clause claun lacked merit 
81 Id. at 553. The court cited Falls v. Town of Dyer, 875 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 
1989), which held that a class of only one member can state a claun under the 
Equal Protection Clause if the plamtiff can show that a combmation of legiSlative 
and executive action has smgled hun out for uruque treatment Id. 
82 Herro, 44 F.3d at 553. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1990). 
86 Id. at 1472. 
87 Id. 
88 I d. (citations omitted). 
89 Id. at 1473. 
90 New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
91 Id. at 1475-76. 
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because the "plamtiffs [did] not allege that they [were] smgled out because 
they belong to any particular class.•>92 The court set forth the governing 
standard for equal protection clauns: "In order to assert a constitutional 
claun based on VIolation of equal protection, a complammg party must 
assert disparate treatment based on therrmembership m a particular group. 
Discnmmation based merely on mdividual, rather than group, reasons will 
not suffice.',g3 
In accord with tlns group of Seventh Circuit opwons IS Futermck v. 
Sumpter Townshzp,94 m which the Sixth Circuit reJected what amounted to 
a "malictous enforcement" claun.95 The plamtiff, who owned a trailer park, 
sued a Michigan official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a VIolation ofhis nght 
to equal protection, allegmg that the official had selectively enforced state 
envrronmental regulations, delayed a sewer hookup "maliCiously'' and in 
''bad faith," and consprred with the township to charge an exorbitant sewer 
hookup fee.96 
The district court dismssed theplamtiff's equal protection claun.97 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.98 The court reVIewed the law concernmg the 
doctrme of selective enforcement, under which a plamtiff may have a 
VIable equal protection claun if the dectsion to enforce the law IS made 
either m retaliation for the exerciSe of a constitutional nght or because of 
membership m a vulnerable group.99 Futermck,.the court noted, did not 
claun to be a member of any group; nor did he claun that he was bemg 
puniShed for exerctsmg a constitutionalnght. The Sixth Circuit did not cite 
Esmail, but it expressly declined to accept plamtiff's "class of one" equal 
protection theory 100 The Sixth Circuit relied pnncipally on Oyler v. 
Boles, 101 m which-according to the Sixth Circuit-the Supreme Court 
"mention[ ed] only arbitrary classifications as a basis for selective 
enforcement liability."102 The Sixth Circuit went on to say that it"[ did] not 
92 Id. at 1481-82. 
93 Id. at 1481. 
94 Futenuckv. SumpterTownshtp, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996). 
95 See zd. at 1060. 
96 Id. at 1052-54. 
97 Id. at 1052. 
98 Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to all chums except the Distnct Court's 
finding of Eleventh Amendment lDlDlUnity for some defendants. I d. 
99 Id. at 1056 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). 
100 Id. at 1057-60. 
101 Oylerv. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
102 Futemzck, 18 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted). 
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believe that choosmg to enforce the law agamst a particular mdiVIdual is 
a 'classification' as that term ts normallyunderstood"103 
The Sixth Circuit's difficultywith theplamtiff's claun went beyond the 
nature of the odd-lookmg "class" plamtiff purported to represent. There 
were federalism and separation of powers concerns as well.104 The 
Futernzck court set forth several "compelling reasons that the sundry 
motivations of local regulators should not be policed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, absent the mtent to 
harm a protected group or pumsh the exercise of a fundamental nght."105 
First, the court was discouraged by the "sheer number of possible cases" 
and the effect on the efficiency of state and local admmtstrators.106 As the 
court explamed: 
LegiSlatures often combme tough laws with limited funding for enforce-
ment A regulator IS requrred to make difficult, and often completely 
arbitrary, deciStons about who will bear the brunt of finite efforts to 
enforce the law. As a result, even a moderately artful complamt could 
pamt almost any regulatory action as both selective and mean-sprrited.l07 
The court acknowledged that some crrcuits, most notably the First and 
Second, had purported to solve this dilemma by limiting the availability of 
actions grounded upon a regulator's malice to those m which a plamtiff is 
able to prove that others who are Similarly situated "in all relevant aspects" 
have not been regulated.108 Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that 
this approach allows only cases of "extraordinary selectivity to state a 
claim," it nevertheless reJected the approach as a screenmg deVIce because 
"[ d]etermmmg 'all relevant aspects' of similar situations usually depends 
on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismtssal on a Rule 
12(b )(6) motion."109 The court concluded that "[i]fwe requrre defendants 
to wait until summary Judgment, we burden local and state officials with 
103 Id. The court relied on Webster's dictionary to support its determmation that 
classes of one are, m fact, not "classes" at all for purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 417 (1986) 
(deflnmg "classify" as "to group or segregate m classes that have systematic 
relations usually founded on common properties or characters; sort''). 
104 See Futemzck, 78 F.3d at 1058. 
lOS Id. 
106 Id. 
101 Id. 
108 Id. (quoting Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
109 Id. 
2000-2001] () "CLASSES OF ONE" 87 
the regular prospect of 'fishing expeditions' and meritless suits. In the 
meantime we federalize andconstitutionalize what are essentially Issues of 
local law and policy.mlo 
Second, from a theoretical standpomt, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
"[t]he nature of the right to equal protection also counsels agamst 
expanding a federal nght to protection from non-group animosity on the 
part of local of:fic1als."m The court pomted out that perfectly random 
enforcement of a law would not Implicate the Equal Protection Clause. 112 
Similarly, the court stated, "the presence of personal animosity should not 
tum an otherwise valid enforcement action mto a VIolation of the 
Constitution."113 The court explamed: 
From a constitutional perspective, personal arumosity not related to group 
tdentity or the exerciSe of protected nghts IS as random as the roll of a 
dice. There 1S no constitutionally Significant category of people that have 
a greater or lesser chance of bemg affected by it The Constitution's 
protection begms only when the znczdence of the burden of regulation 
becomes constitutionally suspiCIOus. 114 
It was, then, the wholly arbitrary or ''random" nature of personal animosity 
that, m the Sixth Circuit's VIew, rendered the Equal Protection Clause 
mapposite.115 
Although the Sixth Circuit hastened to add that it did not condone the 
abuse of local or state regulatory power, describmg such abuse as 
"repugnant to the Amencan tradition of the rule oflaw," the court went on 
to state that local governments were in the best position to correct for any 
abuse through the "political processes that appomted [the] regulator m the 
first place.'m6 Further, a plamtiff could seek redress m state courts and 
under state constitutions. "Absent a breakdown m the state's normal 
political process that unfarrly affects a protected group or the exercise of 
constitutional nghts, we can and should trust states to police adequately 
therr own processes."117 
110 Id. at 1058-59 (footnote omitted). 
111 Id. at 1059. 
112 See zd. 
113 Id. 
114Jd. 
liS Id. 
116 Id. 
111Jd. 
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In Olech, 118 however, the Supreme Court went even further than had the 
Seventh, First, and Second Circuits m therr "class of one" precedents, 
consequently disregarding the Sixth Circuit's concerns for allowmg 
"fishing expeditions."119 The Court did not reach the pnnciples of 
"illegitimate anunus" or "intent to lDJure" relied upon by those courts to 
limit the scope of the "class of one'' theory Rather, the Court held that 
mdiv1<lual mistreatment by local government officials could be challenged 
under the federal constitution regardless of the motivation behmd the 
conduct.120 Henceforth, a plamtiff who wiShes to proceed m federal court 
under the Equal Protection Clause need only allege that a government 
official has acted arbitrarily or rrrationally, and has treated the plamtiffless 
favorably than those similarly situated.121 The Supreme Court's apparent 
resolution of the crrcuits' divergence m VIews as to the purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause (i.e., whether the clause was mtended to protect 
not only groups but also "classes of one") merits exammation of the 
ongmal purpose of the clause. 
ill. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING: STRIKING AT CASTES 
As noted, the mtended scope of the protections afforded by the Equal 
Protection Clause 1s a matter of ongomg scholarly debate. The debates of 
the Thuty-Ninth Congress, whlch ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, are 
far too ambiguous to settle many Important questions such as whether the 
framers of the Equal Protection Clause. mtended to procure for blacks 
political or social equality on a broad scale or, more narrowly, to secure for 
them only those nghts enumerated m the Civil Rights Act of 1866.122 They 
certamly do not tell us whether the architects of the clause mtended to 
extend "equal protection" to a so-called "class of one." No one m the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress considered whether an mdiVIdual could challenge 
government action motivated by alleged illegitimate animus under the 
Equal Protection Clause. The concerns of the time, whlch mcluded the 
plight of the newly-freed slaves m the aftermath of a Civil War fought, m 
part, to render them free, were far weightier. 
Although answers to specific questions are rarely found m the ongmal 
debates, considered m broader terms the mtent of the framers IS readily 
118 Village ofWillowbrook v. Olecb, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000) (per cunam). 
119 See supra notes 94-117 and accompanymg text 
120 0/ech, 120 S. Ct at 1074-75. 
121 See zd. at 1075. 
122 See supra note 7 and accompanymg text 
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discernible. As Professor Sunstem has noted, "[t]he Civil War Amend-
ments were based on a wholesale reJection of the supposed naturalness of 
racial hierarchy. An nnportant purpose of the· Civil War Amendments 
was the attack on racial caste."123 The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified m 
1865, formally abolished slavery and represented Congress' first constitu-
tional and legislative attack on the caste system.124 Although the Thirteenth 
Amendment formally abolished slavery, Congress was confronted after the 
amendments ratification by activities m several mtransigent southern states 
that sought to re-establish many of the badges of mfenority mcident to 
slavery. In thewmterof 1865-66, southern states enacted what were known 
as the ''Black Codes," many of which prohibited blacks from ownmg land, 
voting, engagmg m any activity other than domestic service, or leavmg 
therr JObs without suffenng the forfeiture of earned pay.125 'fo many m the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the Black Codes were symbolic of an unrepentant 
South seeking to return to a caste system under which blacks continued to 
occupy the mfenor status nnposed by the mstitution of slavery 126 
Pnor to seeking a constitutional amendment to remedy the situation, 
Congress tnedits hand at a legislative solution. On Apri19, 1866, Congress 
overrode President Andrew Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act ofl866, 
which expressly proVIded the nght to "citizens, of every race and color'' to 
make and enforce contracts, be parties m court, to own and convey real and 
123 Sunstem, supra note 8, at2435 (footnote omitted). Professor Sunstem traces 
the ongms of the anticaste pnnctple to the ongmal frammg of the Constitution. He 
pomts out that "the Constitution forbtds titles of nobility and that an tmportant part 
of the founding creed mvolved the reJection of monarchical heritage, largely on the 
ground that monarchy made caste distinctions among fundamentally equal human 
bemgs." Id. at 2434-35. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(stating that the legtslature should not enact "unJust and partial laws" that operate 
"to the mJury of the pnvate nghts of particular classes of citizens"). 
124 The Thirteenth Amendment provtdes, m part: "[n]either slavery nor mvol-
unta:ry servitude, except as a purushment for cnme whereof the party shall have 
been duly convtcted, shall extst withm the United States, or any place subJect to 
thetr JUriSdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1. For a discusston of the events 
leading to the passage of the ThtrteenthAmendment, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The 
Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thzrteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. 
REv 1 (1974). 
125 See Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Officzal Acceptance of Vio-
lence to Personal Security and Subverszon of Propnetary Rights and Ambitions 
Followzng Emanczpation, 1865-1910,10 CHI.-KENTL. REv 439,453-61 (1994). 
126 See Davtd F Forte, Spzritual Equality, The Black Codes and the Amen-
camzation of the Freedmen, 43 LoY. L. REv 569,604-09 (1998). 
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personal property, to enJOY the full benefit of all laws for the security of 
person or property enJoyed by white persons, and to be subject to like 
purushm.ent and none other.127Many Republicans m Congress believed that 
the Civil Rights Act was beyond the constitutional power of Congress.128 
There was also Widespread concern that the nghts enumerated m the Civil 
Rlghts Act ought not be left to the discretion of future Congresses. 129 
The Fourteenth Amendment, which had been under consideration for 
two months pnorto Johnson's veto, was designed pnncipallyto protect the 
Civil Rights Act from constitutional attack.130 Representative John 
Bingham ofOh10 first set forth the "equal protection" language that would 
ultimately appear m section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment m a proposed 
amendment that would have granted to Congress the power ''to pass all 
necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons m every State of the 
Uruon equal protection m therr nghts, life, liberty, and property "131 
Bingham himself was not particularly clear with regard to the mtended 
purpose of the proposed amendment, but participants m the debate 
understood Bingham's language to prohibit only laws that smgled out 
certam classes of persons for spectal benefits or burdens.132 Like many 
others, Senator William Pitt Fessenden ofMame, the conservative leader 
of the Republican maJority m the Senate, understood the language to be 
mmed at the lDlpenmssible "class legtslation" of the Black Codes.133 
127 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current versiOn at 42 
u.s.c. §§ 1981-1982 (1991)). 
128 See Bickel, supra note 7, at 22. 
129 See BERGER, supra note 7, at 23. 
130 See rd., see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizens hlp Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV L. REv 1, 14 (1977). 
131 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). As it would finally appear 
after several revisions, the proposed amendment read: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all pnvileges and 
mununities of citizens m the several states and to all persons m the 
several States, equal protection m the nghts of life, liberty, and property. 
BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
REcONSTRUCTION 61 (1914) (citations omitted). 
132 See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legrslation, and Color-
blindness, 96 MICHL. REv 245, 282-83 (1997). 
133 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). Similar sentiments had 
been expressed dunng the debate over the Civil Rights Act Representative James 
Wilson, the Iowa Republican who sponsored the bill m the House, srud it would 
mean only that "[ o ]ne class shall not be requrred to support alone the burdens 
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Representative Hotchlass ofNew York, a moderate Republican who spoke 
agamst Bingham's proposal, stated that its equal protection language was 
designed to forbid a state to "discnmmate between its citizens and g~ve one 
class of citizens greater nghts than it confers upon another."134 While he 
found tlus a laudable goal, Hotchkiss refused to support the proposal 
, because it left protectionagamstunequalleg~slation to Congress's whim.135 
Better, he thought, to enact language that outlawed all such leg~slation by 
proViding that ''no State shall discnmmate agamst any class of its 
citizens."136 • 
Hotchkiss's suggestion was not Ignored. In fact, when the equal 
protection proposal reemerged from Committee, it had been changed from 
a grant of authority to Congress to its present form-a limitation, though 
an unspecified one, pnncipally on state leg~slative authority.137 The 
proponents of the reVISed equal protection language explamed that it dealt 
a blow to eXIsting special class legislation m the states. Senator Jacob 
Howard, a Michigan Republican, delivered the speech presenting the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate. 138 The speech deserves special 
attention, as it represented theJomt Committee's official explanation of its 
proposal.139 Senator Howard explamed: 
[The Equal Protection Clause] abolishes all class legiSlation m the States 
and does away with the mjustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a 
code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hangmg of a black man for 
a cnme for whtch the white man IS not to be hanged. It protects the black 
man m hiS fundamental nghts as a citizen with the same shield wh1ch it 
throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend 
to the black man, I had almost called it the poor pnvilege of the equal 
protection of the law? Ought not the time to be now passed when one 
whtch should rest on all classes alike." /d. at 1117. Prest dent Andrew Johnson, who 
vetoed the Civil Rights Act, nevertheless objected to the Black Codes on snnilar 
grounds. In hts December 1865 State of the Umon address, President Johnson 
declared that "there IS no room for favored classes or monopolies." 6 JAMES D. 
R!CHARDSON,A COMPll..ATIONOFTiiEMESSAGESANDP APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 
1789-1897, 361-62 (1901). 
134 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
135 See ld. 
136 /d. 
137 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
138 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-67 (1866). 
139 SeeJOSEPHB.JAMES, THEFRAMINGOFTHEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT 137 
(1956). 
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measure of JUStice IS to be meted out to a member of one caste while 
another and a different measure IS meted out to the member of another 
caste, both castes bemg alike citizens of the United States, both bound to 
obey the same laws, to sustam the burdens of the same Government, and 
both equally responsible to JUStice and to God for the deeds done m the 
body?140 
Other members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress expressed stm.ilar 
sentiments m support of the equal protection proposal. Representative 
James Wilson of Iowa, for example, stated that m a true republican 
government there ts ''no class legtslation, no class pnvileges," and no laws 
that legtslate "agamst [one class] for the purpose of advantaging the 
mterestsof[another]."141 TotheframersoftheFourteenthAmendment, the 
Black Codes epitomiZed such legislation; the Codes reduced the newly 
freed slaves to a condition of mvoluntary servitude that undermined the 
command of the Thirteenth Amendment.142 
Throughout the ratification process, Republicans consistently lauded 
the protection affQrded by equal protection agamst tmpermtssible class 
legtslation.143 Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsm smd that the Equal 
Protection Clause was destgned to prevent the states from "deny[ing] to all 
classes of its citizens the protection of equallaws"144 and to gtve the federal 
government ''the power to protect classes agamst class legtslation."145 
Representative Thomas Eliot ofMassachusetts stated that the clause would 
''prohibit State legtslation discnmmating agmnst classes of citizens."146 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens ofPennsylvama satd that it would mean 
14° CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
141 Id. at 174. 
142 See 1d. at 1621-22, where Representative Myers suggested that the Black 
Codes "impose by mdirection a servitude whlch the Constitution now forbids." Id. 
Representative Thayer argued that the Black Codes were bemg used to "reduce 
thiS class ofpepple to the condition of bondmen." Id. at 1151. Senator Wilson 
stated that Black Codes "practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." Id. at 
340. 
143 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 115. Nelson observes that Republicans fre-
quently stated that the "only effect'' of the Equal Protection Clause would be to 
forbid the states from "discnmmat[ing] arbitrarily between different classes of 
citizens" and to reqwre them to "treat[] [therr] citizens equally, distinguiShing 
between them only when there was a basis m reason for domg so." Id. 
144 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 219 (1866). 
145 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868). 
146 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866). 
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only that ''the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, Amencan, 
Inshman, Afncan, German or Turk."147 
Thus the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
concerned with class legtslation that lDlposed special burdens on one class 
of citizens that were not to be shared by others, or granted special benefits 
to one class not granted to another, prlDlarily because such special 
legtslation "embodied discrlD1lnation and m this way helped to create 
caste."148 As one commentator has observed: ''The Idea that laws should be 
general and not tamted by considerations of class or caste was Widely 
recogruzed and accepted before the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was 
enacted."149 As Justice Harlan, dissenting m Plessy v. Ferguson, 150 
eloquently and succmctly stated the prmciple: "[l]n VIew of the Constitu-
. tion, m the eye ofthe law, there IS in this country no supenor, dommant, 
ruling class of citizens. There IS no caste here.msr 
IV EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY 
The Supreme Court's theory of wrongful discnmmation under the 
Equal Protection Clause has come a long way smce Justice Harlan's dissent 
m Plessy. The anti-caste principle articulated by Justice Harlan was ~ 
embraced by Congress, and eventually by the Court, as it stepped m to 
147 Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa. 
(Sept. 4, 1866), zn THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 
1993). 
148 Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2436. One commentator has argued that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Equal Protection Clause to 
nationalize a prohibition agamst "partial" or "special" laws, which smgled out 
groups of persons for special benefits or burdens and had been developed m the 
state.courts m the first half of the mneteenth century. See Melissa L. Saunders, 
Equal Protection, Class Legzslation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH L. REv 245 
(1997). Professor Saunders argues that while the framers of the Equal Protection 
Clause did mtend to abolish all "caste" legiSlation, as Professor Sunstem and others 
have argued, they used the term "class" legislation m a broader sense-"to refer to 
any law that smgled out a certam class for special benefits or burdens, whether or 
not it had a subordinating effect on a particular class." Id. at 290 n.198. 
149 Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legzslation, and Sex Discn-
mznation: One Small Cheer for Mr Herbert Spencer's Soczal Statics, 88 MICH. L. 
REv 1366, 1376 (1990). 
lso Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
lSI Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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adjudicate and nnplement the Fourteenth Amendment.152 The Supreme 
Court, however, founditselfill-eqmpped to enforce the anti-castepnnciple, 
a task better left to Congress through the legislative function. To be sure, 
the Court continues to be sensitive to the stigmatization of protected groups 
by legiSlative act. That concern, agamst sigmatization, was at the heart of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from the begmnmg, and some equal protection 
theones focus exclusively on the plight of hlstoncally subJugated groups 
or classes. Modem equal protection Jurisprudence, however, has become 
more generally concerned with whether like classes are treated alike by the 
government. 
"Classes of one" who clann that local admlrustrators have engaged m 
arbitrary or rrrational decisionmakmg do not mse core Issues of caste or 
stigmatization. That IS not to say, however, that nothmg can be learned 
from theones based on caste or stigma, or, for that matter, from the 
framers' ongmal mtentions. This portion of the Article bnefly explores 
some of the pnncipal theones of equal protection. Although the focus of 
equal protection theones has varied, the unifymg pnnciple-borrowed 
from the framers themselves-has remamed that governmental actions that 
intentionally disadvantage certain groups, or certain mdiVIduals as 
1 members of a group, are forbidden under the Equal Protection Clause. 
A. Theones of Stigma and Caste 
There are four pnncipal theones of equal protection, three of which 
will be discussed m Parts N .A and IV.B. Only one of the four theo-
nes-the so-called "anti-differentiation pnnciple"-bears directly on the 
"class of one" scenano. This theory IS discussedm somewhat greater detail 
mPartiV.C. 
1. The Anti-Discnmmation Pnnczple-Stigma 
The "stigma" theory153 of equal protection can be traced to the Supreme 
Court's opwon in Brown v. Board of Education and, before that declSlon, 
to Justice Harlan's dissent mP/essy. It was perhaps best articulated by Paul 
152 Perhaps the Court's best known anti-caste deciStons are Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which mvalidated segregation m education, and 
Lovzng v. Virgzma, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down state mtscegenation 
laws. 
153 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting the detnmental unpact of segregation). 
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Brest/54 who used the phrase "anti-discnmmation pnnciple" to describe 
''the general pnnciple disfavonng classifications and other decisions and 
practices that depend on the race (or ethmc ongm) of the parties 
affected."155 The theory focuses on the unfair stigma caused by race-based 
decisions that disadvantage members of mmority groups. Brest focuses on 
the harm caused by race-based classifications: "Decisions based on 
assumptions ofintnns1cworth and selective mdifference mflictpsychologi-
cal mJury by stigmatizing therr VIctims as mfenor."156 This theory helps to 
explam why rules that employ "suspect" predicates~ such as racial 
predicates~ are umquely subJect to JUdicial mvalidation under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
As Justice Black explamed m Korematsu v. United States~ 151 the case 
m which the government attempted to Justify the mternment of Japanese-
Amencans: "[A]lllegal restnctions which curtail the civil nghts of a smgle 
raCial group are Immediately suspect. . [C]ourts must subJect them to the 
most ng~d scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes JUstify the 
eXIstence of such restnctions; racial antagorusm never can."158 Although 
concerned pnmarily with racial stigmatizatio~ the anti-discnmmation 
pnnciple IS broad enough to protect other group traits as well~ mcluding sex 
and illegitimacy 159 
While concerned with the harmful effects of discnmmation based upon 
membership m racial or ethmc groups~ the anti-discnmmation pnnciple IS 
an mdiVIdualistic theory, concerned with the harm VIsited upon mdiVIdual 
members of the smgled-out group.160 The group itself, under this theory, 
has no mtnns1c moral value or nght to compensation for harm VIsited upon 
its members. As Brest explamed m his semmal article: 
For adm1mstrative purposes, some remedies for racial discnnunation are 
triggered by disproportionate rac1al Impact or treat persons according to 
membership m rac1al groups; but group membership 1s always a proxy for 
the mdivtdual's nght not to be discnmmated agmnst. Similarly, remedies 
for race-specific harms recogmze the sociOlogical consequences of group 
IS4 PaulBrest,InDefonse oftheAntidiscnmmationPnnczp/e, 90 HARV.L.REv 
1 (1976). 
Iss Id. at 1. 
Is6 Id. at 8. 
Is? Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
Iss Id. at 216. 
Is9 See Brest, supra note 154, at 5. 
I60 Id. at 48. 
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tdentification and afftliation only to assure JUstice for mdivtdual 
members.161 
In sum, the anti-discnmmation pnnc1ple reJects "[t]he notion that the 
treatment of mdivtduals as a group for malign purposes requrres therr 
treatment as a group for bemgn compensatory purposes."162 
. 
2. The Group-Disadvantagmg Pnncwle-Caste 
OwenFiss advanced what he called the "group-disadvantagmg"theory 
of equal protection m his well-known article "Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause."163 Fiss's concern IS with practices that aggravate the 
subordinate position of a "specially disadvantaged group," 
paradigmatically blacks.164 In contrast to the anti-discnmmation prmc1ple, 
Fiss's theory 1s explicitly group-onented. Fiss explams that one of the 
reasons blacks fall withm the parameter of the Equal Protection Clause IS 
because they are a "social group"165-a social entity with a "distinct 
eXIstence apart from its members"166-that "has been m a position of 
perpetual subordination," and whose "political power IS severely 
crrcumscribed."167 Fiss further explams that the Equal Protection Clause Is 
not concerned with the effect of laws on particular mdivtduals. What IS 
critical under the group-disadvantagmg theory IS that a law or practice 
aggravates or perpetuates the subordinate position of a specially disadvan-
taged group. Fiss writes: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause should be VIewed 
as a prohibition agamst group-disadvantagmg practices, not unfarr 
treatment . [A] claun of indiVIdual unfairness [should be] put to one 
t6t Id. 
162 Id. at 51. 
163 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF 107, 147 (1976). 
164 See zd. at 147 For a more modem explication of the group-disadvantagmg 
pnnctple, see Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2410. Simply put, Professor Sunstem's 
"anticaste pnnctple" holds that "no group may be made mto second-class citizens." 
Id. at 2429. See also Darnel Farber & Suzanna Sheny, The Panah Pnnczple, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996). 
165 Fiss, supra note 163, at 154. 
166 Id. at 148. Thts, along with what Fiss calls "interdependence"-hts notion 
that "[t]he tdentity and well-bemg of the members of the group and the tdentity and 
well-bemg of the group are linked"-are m hts vtew the necessazy and suffictent 
conditions for the exiStence of a soctal group. !d. 
167 Id. at 154-55. 
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side. "168 Moreover, the theory applies only to "natural classes" or 
groups.169 Fiss explams that "the Equal Protection Clause. [does not 
extend to] what might be considered artificial classes, those created by a 
classification or critenon embodied m a state practice or statute.'mo 
While Fiss 's theory, like other group-onented theones, assumes that it 
IS permissible to have unequal distribution of welfare among mdiVIduals, 
it holds that it IS unJust for one racial or ethruc group to be substantially 
worse off than others. Thus, unlike the anti-discrimmation pnnciple, the 
group-disadvantagmg principle IS essentially mdifferent to the history that 
led to the unequal distribution. Fiss proposes a purely redistributive 
pnnciple that requires relief for any group that constitutes a ''perpetual 
underclass."171 Members of the group may partake of the remedy regardless 
ofwhethertheywere m fact harmed by the state action; they are essentially 
takmg as representatives of therr groups. Fiss's redistributive strategy 
would, m his VIew, "g~ve expression to an ethical view agamst caste, one 
that would make it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of 
subordination for any extended penod oftime."172 
B. Process Theones 
The oft-quoted footnote four m United States v. Carolene Products113 
IS the cornerstone of the ''process theory'' of equal protection.174 As John 
Hart Ely explams: 
In a representative democracy value determmations are to be made by our 
elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote 
them out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process tS undeservmg 
of trust, when • though no one tS actually demed a votce or a vote, 
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantagmg some mmority out of stmple hostility or a prejudiced 
168 Id at 160. 
169 Id. at 148. 
170 Id at 156. 
171 Id. at 150. 
172 Id. at 151. 
173 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
174 See zd. at 152-53 n.4 (''Nor need we enqwre whether prejudice agamst 
discrete and msular mmorities may be a spectal condition, which tends senously 
to curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect mmorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchmg 
JUdictal mquuy."). 
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refusal to recogmze commonalities of interest, and thereby denymg that 
mmority the protection afforded other groups by a representative 
system.175 
A process theory lS concerned with the political role played by preJudices 
and stereotypes about the moral mfenority of the targeted group. The 
concern IS that these preJudices either prevent certam groups from 
participating m the political processes or result m morally obJectionable 
legtslative and executive actions or rules based on fundamentally false 
premtses. 
Under the process theory, the courts serve as a means of correcting 
special lands of malfunctions m the political process, such as discnmtna-
tory treatment of so-called "suspect" classes. Ely mamtams that a suspect 
class IS a "discrete and msular''176 mmority that IS ''barred from the 
pluralist's bazaar, and thus keeps finding itself on the wrong end of the 
legislature's classifications, for reasons that m some sense are discredit-
able."177 The process theory holds that only those groups unable to protect 
themselves through the political process are entitled to heightened JUdicial 
scrutiny of laws disadvantagmg them. They are "relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the maJoritanan political process.'ms Ely does not consider women 
"discrete and msular," therefore, as they have extenstve, close contact with 
men and constitute a maJority of the voting population.179 
C. The Anti-Differentiation Pnnczple 
The concern with stigma, caste and process has gtven way m equal 
protectionJunsprudence to a broader conception of''treating likes alike." 
Twentieth century equal protection JUrisprudence has been dommated by 
thiS "anti-differentiation pnnctple," which asks whether people who are 
similarly situated have been treated similarly The "class of one" cases 
Implicate thts theory of equal protection, as mdiVIduals complam that they 
have been treated differently from all others who are "similarly situated." 
175 JOHNHAR.TELY,DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 {1980). 
176 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
177 ELY, supra note 175, at 152. 
178 San Antomo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
179 ELY, supra note 175, at 164. Ely's theory has been criticiZed forbemg too 
narrow m thts regard. See, e.g., Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of Underclass 
Revzew, 43 STAN. L. REv 1095, 1097-98 (1991). 
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This portion of the Article discusses the anti-differentiation pnnCiple 
thoroughly, as it 1s the most relevant of the four pnmary theones of equal 
protection. 
In explicating the anti-differentiation pnnc1ple, the Supreme Court has 
generally reqmred that discnmmatory state legislation must be based upon 
"reasonable classifications."TheCourthas struggled, however, to precisely 
define the parameters of penmssible government discnmmation. In its 
modem equal protection Junsprudence, the Court has focused pnmarily 
upon (1) the "rationality'' of the government's distinction, and (2) the 
"purpose" of that distinction. 
1. Mimmum Rationality 
Since 1949, when Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek published 
therr leading article on "The Equal Protection of the Laws,"180 the core 
concept m equal protection theory has been the 1dea that equal protection 
requires the equal treatment of"slmilar1y situated" persons.181 As Tussman 
and tenBroek explam: 
The essence of [the Equal Protection Clause] can be stated with 
deceptive slDlplicity. The Constitution does not requrre that thmgs 
different m fact be treated m law as though they were the same. But it 
does requrre, m its concern for equality, that those who are SlDlilarly 
situated be slDlilarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a 
classification IS the degree of its success m treating slDlilarly those 
slDlilarly situated. 182 
The Supreme Court regularly articulates this "likes must be treated as 
likes," or anti-differentiation, theory of equality m its equal protection 
Junsprudence, 183 and other scholars have earned it forward and refined the 
theory withm constitutional scho1arshlp.184 
180 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REv 341 (1949). 
181 Id. at 344. 
182 Id. (footnote omitted). 
183 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 
(1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause IS essentially a direction that all persons 
slmilarly situated should be treated alike.'') (citing Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 
(1982)). 
184 See, e.g., Kenneth W Simons, Ovenncluswn and Undenncluswn: A New 
Model, 36 UCLAL. REv 448,456-60 (1989). 
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It 1s a tru1sm that all laws classify.185 Equal protection, according to the 
anti-differentiation pnnciple, requrres that such classifications have a 
certam relation to the purpose of a particular law The rule Is usually stated 
as reqwnng that a classification be rationally related to legitimate 
government purposes.186 As Tussman and tenBroek charactenze it, the 
Equal Protection Clause embodies a pnnCiple of ''reasonable classifica-
tion."187 
The Supreme Court's earliest standard for legislative and admrmstra-
tive classifications, as applied to government regulation of soc1oeconom1c 
matters, reqwred s~mplythatthere be like treatment of those engagedm the 
regulatedactivities.188 This narrow VIew of the anti-differentiation pnnciple 
was found to be unworkable, as entities withm the class who were treated 
differently were by therr nature not "the same."189 
The anti-differentiation principle, as developedm the Supreme Court's 
equal protection Junsprudence, requrres that legislative enactments and 
executive acts190 meet the basic requrrement ofmtmmum rationality Equal 
protection requrres "some rationality m the nature of the class smgled 
185 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("All 
laws classify, and, unremarkably, the charactenstics that distingutsh the classes so 
created have been JUdged relevant by the legislators responsible for the 
enactment"); Personnel Adm'r ofMass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) 
("Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the 
law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described 
by the law."); see also Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A 
Conceptualization and Apprazsal, 19 COLUM. L. REv 1023, 1068 (1979) ("Every 
time an agency of government formulates a rult>-m particular, every time a 
legiSlature enacts a law-it classifies."). 
186 See, e.g., San Antomo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) 
("A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause 
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard ofrevtew, which 
reqwres only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship 
to legitimate state purposes."). 
187 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344. 
188 See Powell v. Pennsylvarua, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (holding that no 
regulatoryprovtsion was repugnant to equal protection so long as it"place[ d] under 
the same restrictions, and subject[ ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who 
[were] embraced by its prohibitions."). 
189 See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1440. 
190 It has long been established that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all 
state action that demes equal protection, mcluding actions of the legtslative, 
executive, and JUdicial branches. See Virgmta v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 
(1880). 
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out,"191 with rationality tested by the classification's ability to serve the 
purposes intended by the legiSlative or admmtstrative rule. In other words, 
"[t]he courts must reach and deternune the question whether the classifica-
tions drawn m a statute are reasonable m light of its purpose."192 
The government may determme that it IS m the public mterest to treat 
the mentally ill differently from the mentally retarded, 193 Widowed spouses 
who marry before age siXty differently than those who marry after siXty, 194 
and plastic milk containers differently than paperboard contamers.195 The 
Equal Protection Clause requrres that the government JUstify its chmce of 
which classes are subjected to regulation. The rntmmum rationality 
standard IS extraordinarily deferential to the legislature's deternunation of 
"fit" between the classes chosen and the governmental purpose. The 
Supreme Court has generally upheld state classifications when applymg 
rational basis reVIew to equal protection challenges.196 Indeed, under 
rational basis reVIew the Court has been willing to uphold classifications 
so long as they are supported by any conceivable basis, whether that basis 
has been articulated by the legislature or not.197 
2. lllicit Purpose 
Although the fit between legislative means and ends has been the 
dommant approach and has resulted, on rare occasions, m laws bemg 
stncken for lack of a rational basis, the Supreme Court has also mvalidated 
legislative classifications based upon the illegitimate purpose behmd the 
classification. This reVIew of governmental purpose has gamed currency 
191 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,308-09 (1966). 
192 McLaughlin v. Flonda, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
193 Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,321-28 (1993). 
194 Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348-50 (1986). 
195 Minnesota v . .Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461-70 (1981). 
196 See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1443 (stating that the rationality requrrement lS 
"largely equwalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality"). 
197 See zd., see also Kimel v. Flonda Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct 631, 646 (2000) 
("The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not requrre 
States to match age distinctions and the legitimate mterests they serve with 
razorlike prec1S1on."). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike down state 
laws under rational basiS revtew. See Robert C. Farrell, Successfo/ Rational BaslS 
Clazms zn the Supreme Court From the 1971 Term Through Romerv. Evans, 32 
IND. L. REv. 357 (1999) (noting that durmg the past twenty-five years, the 
Supreme Court has mvalidated laws under the rationality test on only ten occasiOns, 
while reJecting such clatmS m one hundred cases). 
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m approXImately the past three decades.198 Indeed, m some mstances it 
appears to have sharper teeth than the traditional means/ends reVlew.199 
The Supreme Court has mvalidated classifications because of 
illegitimate purposes m two categones of cases. The first category consists 
of classifications that favor m-state mterests to those of "outsiders." In 
Zobel v. Williams,200 for example, the Supreme Court struck down as 
rrrational an Alaska statute that distributed mcome from the state's natural 
resources based upon the year m wluch residency was established.201 The 
Court has held that such categonzations, wluch favor politically powerful 
''permanent classes" of residents over out-of-state mterests, are motivated 
by a bare desrre to mJure unrepresented outsiders. A motivation to benefit 
m-state mterests or, conversely, to harm outsiders, IS not a constitutionally 
rational basiS for classifymg groups.202 Professor Sunstem has labeled ill 
motives oftlus sort ''naked preferences."203 
The second category of enactments mvalidated by the Court for lack 
of a legitimate purpose are those m which a politically powerless or 
margmalized group has been smgled out for unfarr treatment.204 These 
''naked preferences" look very much like classifications based upon race 
and gender, which courts have subJected to more exacting scrutiny, 
although the Court has reframed from mvokmg its "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" classificationJunsprudence to strike them down. The earliest case 
was United States Department of Agnculture v. Moreno,205 m wluch the 
198 See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement 
of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv 67, 83-84 (stating that mquuy mto legitimacy of 
legiSlative pwpose did not begm until the 1970s). For a discussion of the difficulty 
of ascertammg leg15lative purpose, see generally William N. Eskndge, Jr. & Phillip 
P. Fnckey, Legzslation Scholarshzp and Pedagogy zn the Post-Legal Process Era, 
48 U. PITT. L.REv .. 691, 702-03 (1987). 
199 See Darnel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Anzmosity, 21 CAMPBELL L. 
REv 125, 139-46 (1'999) (discussmg ''Bare Animosity Revxew"). 
200 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
201 Id. at 63. 
202 See generally Hooperv Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) 
(invalidating New Mexico law that granted tax exemption to Vietnam Veterans 
only if they had res1ded m state pnor to specified date); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (strikmg down Alabama tax on out-of-state 
msurance comparues that was hxgher than tax levied agamst m-state entities). 
203 See Cass R Sunstem, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. 
L. REv 1689 (1984). 
204 See Crane, supra note 199, at 139-46. 
205 United States Dep't of Agnc. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the federal Food Stamp Act 
of 1964 that was mtended to prevent "hippies" and "hippie communes" 
from participating m the food stamp program. Justice Brennan, writing for 
the maJority, stated: "[I]fthe constitutional conception of' equal protection 
of the laws' means anythmg, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desrre to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental mterest."206 
The Supreme Court reVIsited its ''naked animosity'' approach mPlyler 
v. Doe,207 a case mvolvmg a Texas statute that prohibited children of illegal 
1mm1grants from attending public schools. The Court determmed that the 
State's purported JUstifications for the statute were mere subterfuge, and 
that the purpose of the classification was to pumsh the children of illegal 
1mm1grants for therr parents' status. It charactenzed the Texas law as an 
effort to Impose "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not 
accountable for therr disabling status."208 The Court refused to recogmze 
such naked antmosity as a legitimate governmental purpose, and msisted 
that the State "do more than Justify its classification with a concise 
expressiOn of an mtention to discrtmmate" agamst the children of illegal 
Immigrants.209 
The Supreme Court has granted similar protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause to the mentally retarded. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Lzvzng Center, 210 the Court determmed that mrefusmgto grant a special use 
permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, the city 
was motivated by ''negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors 
which are properly cogmzable m a zonmgproceeding."211 Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the State must steer clear of its ''pnvate biases" and act 
solely m the public mterest.212 
Most recently, m Romer v. Evans,213 the Supreme Court mvalidated a 
Colorado constitutional amendment passed by referendum which would 
have prohibited the State of Colorado or any of its political subdiVIsions 
from 
adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy 
whereby homosexual, lesbtan or bisexual onentation, conduct, practices 
206 Id. at 534. 
207 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
208 Id. at 223. 
209 Id. at 227 (citation omitted). 
21° City of Cleburne v. Cleburne L1vmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
211 Id. at 448. 
212 Id. (citing Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
213 Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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or relationships shall constitute or otherwiSe be the basts of or entitle any 
person or class of persons to have or chum any mmority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claun of discnmmation.214 
In Ins maJority opllllon striking down the Colorado constitutional amend-
ment, Justice Kennedy stated: "A law declanng that m general it shall be 
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek ru.d from 
the government IS itself a demal of equal protection of the laws m the most 
literal sense."215 Justice Kennedy mvoked the spirit of the Equal Protection 
Clause, as well as the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, m strikmg down 
the Colorado amendment. The Court determmed that the Colorado 
amendment VIolated the naked ammositypnnciple because it "raiSe[ d] the 
inevitable inference that the disadvantage rmposed IS born of ammosity 
toward the class of persons affected."216 In other words, the Colorado 
amendment was born of a naked desrre to harm gays, lesbians, and 
biSexuals. 
In these "bare anrmosity'' cases, the Supreme Court mvalidated laws 
not because the legiSlature did not formulate a tight "fit" between its means 
and ends, but rather because the ends themselves were forbidden by the 
Equal Protection Clause. In a nation of equal laws, a naked desrre to harm 
a· particular group of people IS a constitutionally illegitimate purpose. 
Simply put, the State cannot smgle out a group of people for adverse 
treatment solely because it does not like them, at least, the Court has 
mdicated, when the group smgled out IS politically unpopular and lacks the 
political wherewithal to defend itself from VIndictive lawmakers. 
V. "CLASSES OF ONE" AND THE EQUAL PROTECfiON CLAUSE 
Far from bemgpre-detemuned bypnorprecedent, Olech appears to be 
at odds with a century of equal protectionJunsprudence. A "class of one" 
IS no class at all, at least not as that term has been defined by the Supreme 
Court. The Court'sJunsprudence reflects the history of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, which Is bound up with notions of group treatment, and has 
never been considered a tool for adjudicating claims of mdiviClual 
miStreatment.217 Thus, contrary to Olech, there IS no doctrmal basiS for 
214 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, znvalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
215 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
216 Id. at 634. 
217 See supra notes 152-216 and accompanymg text. 
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treating an mdiVIdual white male as protected under the Equal Protection 
Clause. "' 
A "class of one" consisting solely of a disappomted white male plamly 
does not Implicate the anti-caste concern that animated the framers of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Nor does such a "class" ruse concerns for 
defending the politically powerless agamst negative stereotypmg or 
differentiation by the government on some illegitimate basts, such as 
sexual onentation or mental capacity, as m more recent Supreme Court 
Junsprudence.218 
The only possible theoretical underpmnmg for mvokmg the clause on 
behalf of such a "class" IS the anti-differentiation pnnctple, which requrres 
at a mmiiDum that the govemment state a rational reason for its line-
drawmg or differentiating pnnctple-its "classification." As explamed 
below, however, while the anti-differentiation theory holds out some 
surface appeal m support of the "class of one" cases, upon closer examma-
tion this theory also fails to proVIde an adequate foundation for applymg 
the Equal Protection Clause to mdiVIduals who are disappomted by the 
deciSions of therr local officials. 
A. The Rights of "Persons" or Groups? 
In the process of openm.g federal courthouse doors to mdiVIdual clmms 
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Olech Court failed to consider even 
baste pnnc1ples. To determme whether mdiVIdual clmms of mistreatment 
are covered under the Equal Protection Clause, it IS necessary m the first 
mstance to examme who or what IS the obJect of the protection afforded 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Does the Equal Protection Clause 
protect mdiVIdual persons, groups of indiVIduals, or both? 
Perhaps the most common understanding of the purpose of the clause 
IS that it protects blacks and other minority classes from racial or ethnic 
stereotypmg or, worse, outnght racism. As Chief Judge Posner pomted out 
m Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n, however, the Equal Protection Clause 
"does not speak of classes," and, m Judge Posner's VIew, "[a] class, 
moreover, can consist of a smgle member."219 As demonstrated m Part II, 
the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause were burdened with far more 
senous concerns at the time the clause was drafted than whether an 
218 See supra notes 163-216 and accompanymg text 
219 Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm 'rs, 101 F.3d 
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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mdiVldual could bnng a Vlable action under its language. They sunply 
never considered the Issue. 
Despite its statement m Olech that its cases ''have recogmzed" such 
clmms, the Supreme Court has never been presented with the Issue of 
whether mdiVldual clmms of mistreatment are properly the subject of the 
Equal Protection Clause.220 The Court has, however, made the same 
seemingly axiOmatic textual observation made by Chief Judge Posner m 
Esmail-thatthe clause speaks m terms of "persons"-m City ofRichmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co.;nt and, more recently, mAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena.222 
In Croson, the Court mvalidated a plan adopted by the Richmond City 
Council that requrred. prune contractors to whom the city awarded 
construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar 
amount of the contract to one or more ''Minority Busmess Enterpnses." In 
settling upon stnct scrutiny as the appropnate standard by which to JUdge 
classifications drawn m favor of mmorities, the Court reJected the 
argument that classifications that seek to benefit mmorities should be 
subJected to lesser scrutiny than those that seek to disadvantage them. To 
emphasiZe its commitment to color-blindness, the Court reiterated that 
"'the nghts created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, 
by its terms, guaranteed to the mdiVldual. The nghts established are 
personal nghts.' '0223 In Adarand, the Court mvalidated federal highway 
220 The Court cited only two cases that it clauned had "recogruzed" class of one 
clauns under the Equal Protection Clause. One of the cases the Court relied upon, 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm 'n ofWebsterCounty, 488 U.S. 336 
(1989), mvolved not an mdiv1dual claun of mistreatment but claims on behalf of 
a group of property owners, who alleged that a tax assessor had assessed their 
property differently from the property of those similarly situated based upon an 
Improper charactenstic shared only by petitioners' properties. That IS not a "class 
of one" scenano, but IS rather the sort of systematic line-drawmg with which the 
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned. The other case, Sioux City 
Bndge Co. v. Dalinta County, Neb., 560 U.S. 441,446 (1923), IS a remnant of the 
Court's earliest efforts to articulate a rationality standard. See supra notes 188-89 
and accompanymg text. Sioux City was another dispute over tax assessments, m 
which the Court treated all taxpayers as belongmg to asmgle "class," and found the 
possibility of differential treatment of one class member-Sioux City-Implicated 
pnnc1ples of equal protection. Sioux City, S60 U.S. at 446. 
221 City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
222 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200 (1995). 
223 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 
(1948)). 
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contract set-astdes for mmority busmess enterpnses. In the course of 
rejecting the Idea of "bemgn" federal racial classifications, the Court 
declared it a "baste pnnctple" that the Equal Protection Clause "protects 
persons, not groups," and went on to Identify the nght to equal protection 
as a "personal nght."224 If the object of the clause IS to protect "persons" 
and ISm fact concerned only with ''personal nghts," perhaps the Equal 
Protection Clause proVIdes an mdiVIdual, regardless of race, gender or 
other group charactenstic, a federal constitutional remedy for unfarr 
treatment at the hands of local officials. 
As noted, m Olech the Supreme Court did not so much as mention the 
text of the Equal Protection Clause. Nor, despite the fact that its statements 
m Adarand and Croson appear on therr face to support the pnnctple that 
class or group charactenstics are UTelevant under the Equal Protection 
Clause, did the Olech Court rely upon those statements. Careful observa-
tion of the context m whlch the Supreme Court articufated this mdiVIdualis-
tic approach to equal protection demonstrates why the Court did not even 
citeAdarand and Croson. Those cases do not stand for the proposition that 
the object of equal protection ts the mdiVIdual, wholly separate and apart 
from any group to whlch he or she belongs. Indeed, when considered m 
context, the Court's comments go m the opposite direction. 
It IS critical to recogmze that m Croson and Adarand the Supreme 
Court was addressmg the tssue of affirmative action, an Issue that presents 
''the tension between the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal 
treatment of all citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate 
the effects of past discnmmation on the opportunities enjoyed by mmority 
groups m our society "225 The pnnctpalissue before the Court m Croson, 
and later m Adarand, was whether affirmative action policies were to be 
subjected to the same "stnct scrutiny" as other race-based classifications. 
In explammg its answer m the affirmative, the Court sa1d m Croson and 
Adarandthat equal protectionnghts are personal msofar as the government 
may not use race as the sole critenon m public declSlon-makmg, whether 
distributing benefits or burdens, absent some very compelling reason (i.e., 
remedymgthe effects of past or current discnmmation226). After comment-
224 Adarand, SIS U.S. at 227 
225 Croson, 488 U.S. at 476-77 
226 As the Supreme Court held m Croson, however, "an amorphous claun that 
there has been past discnmmation m a particular mdustry cannot justify the use of 
an unytelding ractal quota." Id. at 499. If the government IS to use race at all, it 
must have evtdence that the scope of the remedy it proposes IS limited m some 
reasonable sense to the IDJUry it wiShes to redress. See ld. 
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mg that the Equal Protection Clause ''protects persons, not groups," the 
Court explamed: 
It follows from that pnnc1ple that all governmental action based on 
race-a group classification long recogruzed as "in most crrcumstances 
rrrelevant and therefore prohibited,'' should be subjected to detailed 
judicial mquuy to ensure that the personal nght to equal protection of the 
laws has not been mfrmged. These Ideas have long been central to this 
Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding "bemgn" state and 
federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with 
them.227 
In other words, the government IS generally prohibited from usmg race or 
other class-based charactenstics as a proxy. In the affirmative action 
context, a white person has a ''personal nght" not to be pumshed because 
ofms skm color for past discnmmation that IS umdentified, unproven, and, 
therefore, unconnected to him. Thus, under Croson andAdarand, it is the 
mdiVIdual's differential treatment based on hzs race that Implicates the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
The Import of the Supreme Court's mdiVIdualistic approach to equal 
protection m affirmative action cases IS that even corrective JUstice must be 
color-blind. Non-VIctims should not benefit, and non-sinners should not 
pay. Equal protection nghts are ''personal" only Insofar as the purpose. of 
the clause IS to make the mdiVIdual, and not the group, whole. However, 
what the clause reaches, and sometimes forbids, m the first Instance 1s 
group-disadvantagmg governmental action. In other words, the clause IS 
remedially personal msofar as remedies are fasmoned to fit mdiVIdual 
cases, to reward VIctims and to pumsh wrongdoers, but underpmnmg this 
mdiVIdualistic approach IS the notion that the government generally may 
not disadvantage members of a class or group solely because they share 
some common charactenstic. To borrow Professor Brest's succmct 
explanation, the Supreme Court reJects the "notion that the treatment of 
mdiVIduals as a group for malign purposes requrres therr treatment as a 
group for bemgn compensatory purposes.•>228 
B. There zs Not Always a "Class" 
The language of the Equal Protection Clause settles nothmg with 
regard to "class of one" cases. While it 1s the mdiVIdual ''person" who 1s 
227 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashl v United States, 320 U.S. 
81, 100 (1943)). 
228 See Brest, supra note 154, at 51. 
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benefitted or harmed by government action m any particular case, the 
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned with group or class 
distinctions.229 Whatever other conclusions one m.1ght draw from the 
ratification debates, it 1s beyond dispute that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were pnnc1pally concerned with 
eradicating the caste discnmmation VIsited upon blacks m the post-Civil 
War era.230 It IS also beyond debate that, whatever the mtentions of the 
framers with regard to the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Supreme Court long ago expanded the list of "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" classifications to mclude those based upon gender and illegiti-
macy.231 All other classifications are subjected to so-called ''rational basts" 
reVIew, which means either that the Court will analyze the degree of 
"fit" between government means and ends,232 or, m a small but growmg 
subset of cases, will mvalidate a law that the Court deems to have an 
illegitimate purpose, 1.e., an mtent to disadvantage a politically powerless 
group.233 
In sum, Judictal mterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 1s mextncably bound up with notions of group 
charactenstics. It 1s the state's proxy, or broad generalization, that IS 
subjected to scrutiny under the clause. 
In this respect, the Equal Protection Clause IS quite different from other 
proVIsions of the Bill ofRlghts. It IS clear, for example, that the protection 
agamstunreasonable searches and seiZUres afforded to''persons" under the 
FourthAmendment234 does not depend on group membership or status. The 
same IS true of the nghts against double jeopardy and self-mcrlm.lnation 
229 See supra notes 152-228 and accompanymg text 
230 See supra notes 122-51 and accompanymg text 
231 See ERWINCHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LA W:PRINCIPLESANDPOLICffiS 
§§ 9.4, 9.6 (1997). 
232 See zd. at 541-45 (describmg the "reasonable relationship" requrrement of 
the rational basiS test). 
233 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(invalidating, under the rational basts test, a zonmg ordinance that prevented the 
operation of a home for the mentally retarded). 
234 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provtdes: 
The nght of the people to be secure m therr persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, agamst unreasonable searches and seiZUres, shall not be viOlated, 
and no Warrants shall ISsue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affrrmation and particularly describmg the place to be searched, and the 
persons or thmgs to be seiZed. 
U.S. CONST. amend. N 
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afforded the ''person" under the Fifth Amendment.235 The Equal Protection 
Clause 1s different, however, because it addresses the unique wrong of 
discnmmation. 
Professor Sunstem explamed thls pomt m ms recent book.236 With 
regard to the mdiVIdualistic text of the Equal Protection Clause ("any 
person"), he states: 
To be sure, "any person" may complam that a classification IS constitu-
tionally unacceptable. But on what grounds can "any person" seek special 
JUdicial assiStance? Under the equal protection clause, all claimS of 
constitutional discnmmation are necessarily based on complamts about 
treatment that smgles out a characteriStic shared by a group. • The ISsue 
IS whether the government's use of that particular shared characterutic IS 
disfavored from the constitutional pomt of VIew. There IS no senous 
question about whether the charactenstics of which "any person" may 
complam are shared characteriStics; of course they are. In this sense, 
clam1s of unconstitutional discnmmation are always clam1s about the 
government's ImpermiSsible use of some group-based characterutic, even 
if those clatms are made by "any·person."237 
In sum, the essence of the Equal Protection Clause 1s the prohibition of 
group-based discnmmation. 
Nearly all of the Supreme Court's equal protection Jurisprudence 
addresses legislative classifications. The legislature draws classifications 
based, hopefully, on some reasoned distinction rumed at servmg a lawful 
purpose. By contrast, not all admmlstrative declSlons construct a we/they 
line capable ofmeanmgfulJudictal reVIew. This 1s particularly true m the 
"class of one" cases. In these cases the charge 1s that a government of:fic1al 
has smgled out an mdiV1dual who does not belong to any group, vulnerable 
or otherwise, for unfarr treatment. There has, quite simply, been no effort 
235 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, m relevant 
part: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwiSe Infamous 
cnme, unless on presentment or mdictment of a Grand Jwy nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put mJeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled m any cnmmal case to be a witness 
agamst himSelf. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V 
236 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
237 Id. at 125-26. 
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whatsoever to draw a line based upon some purportedly relevant distin-
gUishing charactenstic. Consequently, there IS no "classification" as that 
term. has been mterpretedandappliedm equal protectionJunsprudence and 
scholarslnp. 
Despite the absence of any effort to classify for the purpose of 
enforcement of the law, Esmail and the other cases m winch courts 
confrontedmdiVIdual clmms ofvmdictive action pnorto Olech determmed 
that the absence of competing groups did not take the Equal Protection 
Clause out ofplay.238 The First and Second Circuits did not state explicitly 
why the absence of an Identifiable group charactenstic did not foreclose 
reVIew under the Equal Protection Clause. At least m its most recent "class 
of one" precedents, the Seventh Circuit ventured a two-pronged answer to 
tlns doctnnal dilemma. Its textual answer was discussed m the preceding 
section. The court's second pomtwas that "[a] class, moreover, can consist 
of a smgle member."239 Indeed, according to Clnef Judge Posner: "There 
IS always a class."240 In.Esmail, the Seventh Circuit held that the plamtiff' s 
suit was not ''barred by the 'class of one' rule, because there IS no such 
rule."241 In Olech, the Supreme Court accepted tlns pnnc1ple as well settled. 
There are several problems with the notion that ''there ts always a 
class" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, or, stated differently, 
that the alleged discnmmation creates the class. The first 1s a matter of 
stmple definition. Classes and castes are group separators. IndiVIduals are 
sorted mto one class or another based upon some charactenstic, like skm 
color or gender, that they share with other members of the same group. 242 
238 See, e.g., Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (explammg 
that an mdivtdual ought to have a remedy under the Equal Protection Clause). 
239 Indiana State TeachersAss'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F .3d 
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996). 
240 /d. > 
241 Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180. 
242 See supra note 103 and accompanymg text; see also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 248-49 (6th ed. 1990) (defimng "class" as "[a] group of persons, 
thmgs, qualities, or activities, havmg common charactenstics or attributes," and 
"classification" as an "[a]rrangement mto groups or categones on the bas1s of 
established critena''). Similar class concepts antmate the definition of 
"discnmmate." See supra note 102 and accompanymg text It may be argued that 
my approach to "classes" requtres courts to draw difficult lines from time to time. 
Are two people enough to mstitute a "class," or three? In most cases m which there 
has been discnmmation based on group or shared charactenstics, the classification 
will be clear. The pomt IS that equal protection prov1des a "personal" nght to be 
free from mv1dious group or class discnnunation based on shared charactenstics 
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Consistent with this definition of class, all of the equal protection 
theones-anti-subjugation, group-disadvantagmg, process, and anti-
differentiation-have as therr focus the treatment of one group VIs-a-VIs 
another.243 The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence mediates 
these group controversies generally by reVIewmg the legislature's 
classifications under the "rational basis" reVIew for proper fit, and 
occasiOnally for nnproper purpose, and uses "stnct scrutiny" only to 
mvalidate those classifications based upon a "suspect'' charactenstic.244 
Pnorto Olech, the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed whether 
an mdiVIdual can constitute a "class" for purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause. With few exceptions, the Supreme Court's equal protection cases 
have mvolved either legislative line-drawmg that places different groups 
on opposite sides of a chosen line, or executive action, such as cnmmal 
prosecution, that targets a particular class or group.245 The Seventh Circuit 
"class of one" cases nowhere mentioned any of the numerous Supreme 
Court precedents that describe the Equal Protection Clause as a benchmark 
for JUdgmg the validity of governmental groupmgs of mdiVIduals. In 
Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n, the Seventh Circuit relied on Nixon v. 
Admzmstrator of General Servzces,246 a case mvolvmg a legislative 
enactment concermng the treatment to be afforded to former President 
Nixon's presidential matenals, mcluding certain tape recordings that were 
m danger ofbemg destroyed. The Supreme Court held that President Nixon 
was a "legitimate class of one"247 such that Congress's enactment smgling 
out his papers did not constitute an unconstitutional "bill of attamder."248 
The Nixon case IS readily distinguishable on the ground that it did not 
that are arbitrary or UTelevant 
243 See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344-53. 
244 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 231, at 529-31. See also Kimel v. FlondaBd. 
ofRegents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-47 (2000) (holding that age classifications do not 
mvolve a htstoncally subJugated mmority, and are thus appropnately subJect only 
to rational basiS review). 
245 See znfra notes 283-309 and accompanymg text. 
246 Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
247 Id. at 472. 
248 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3. Thts clause provides: "No Bill of Attainder or 
ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. A bill of attainder IS "a law that legiSlatively 
determmes guilt and mflicts pumshment upon an zdenti.fiab/e mdivzdua/ without 
proVISIOn of the protections of a JUdicial tnal." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468 (emphasiS 
added). President Nixon Initially challenged the act as violative of both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the prohibition on bills of attainder. However, he abandoned 
the equal protection agreement before the Supreme Court Id. at 471 n.33. 
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mvolve a claun ofunfarr treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, but 
rather an allegation of an unconstitutional ''Bill of Attamder," which 
smgles out an mdiVIdual or group for special pumshm.ent. Given that the 
Court was not even discussmg the Equal Protection Clause and classifica-
tions challenged pursuant to that clause, Nixon IS thm support mdeed for 
the statement that ''there 1s always a class" under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The other cases cited by the Seventh Circuit demonstrate the group-
focus of the clause. The court cited City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes,249 which 
mvolved not a "class of one," but a murucipal ordinance that prohibited all 
vendors from selling foodstuffs m LoUISiana's French Quarter unless they 
had continuously operated therr busmess m that location for eight or more 
years.250 The city, thus, drew a line separating the group oflong-standing 
vendors from those who had operated therr busmesses for less than the 
purportedly relevant time penod. Thus, Dukes set up a classic Equal 
Protection Clause mqmryregardingthe legtslative "fit" between means and 
ends. 
In search of some support for its theory of equal protection, the Seventh 
Circuit stated m Esmail that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne bvzng Center, 
Inc. 251 "implied" that an mdivtdual ought to have a remedy under the Equal 
Protection Clause where he 1S subJected to vmdictive governmental 
action.252 The Court's concern m City of Cleburne, however, was not with 
unfair treatment VISited upon an mdiVIdual, but rather with a legtslative 
classification that smgled out mentally retarded persons as a group and 
placed them, based upon unwarranted stereotypes, under restrictions not 
borne by members of the maJority group.253 
Far from "implymg'' support for "class of one" equal protection 
cases, pnor to Olech the Supreme Court had strongly suggested that it 
would reJect the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a "class" for purposes 
of the Equal Protection Clause can be "defined by reference to the discn-
mmation itself."254 In Personnel Admzmstrator of Massachusetts v. 
249 City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per cunam). 
250 Id. at 298. 
251 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
252 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995). 
253 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (explammg that the ordinance shows "an 
trrational preJudice agamst the mentally retarded" while noting that fraternity and 
sorority members are not subject to the same treatment). 
254 IndianaStateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 199.6). 
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Feeney,255 the Court held that m order to state a chum under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a plamtiff must do more than demonstrate the disparate 
unpact of a law; she must also demonstrate that the government official 
acted with the mtent to discrunmate.256 Further, the "intent" requrred IS of 
a particular nature when the Equal Protection Clause IS mvoked: the 
decision-maker must have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least m part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an zdentifiable group."251 Feeney came very close mdeed to 
stating a "class of one" rule m equal protection cases. The bnef per cunam 
opmton issued m Olech does not even mention Feeney. 
Under the Supreme Court's anti-differentiation prmciple, as explamed 
m Feeney, an equal protection claun must be based on mtentional 
discrunmation agamst the plamtiffbecause of membership m a particular 
class, not merely on allegations ofunfarr treatment of the mdiVIdual. The 
Sixth Circuit's Futernzck deciSion IS not the only Circuit opinlon that 
rejected an equal protection claun based on allegations that an mdividual 
was treated unfarrly.258 As noted, pnor to Esmail, several of the Seventh 
Circuit's own precedents rejected the notion that a "class" can consiSt of a 
smgle person.259 Some of those opm1ons cited Feeney for the proposition 
that allegations by an mdiVIdual that the person was treated unfarrly or 
vmdictively do not suffice under the Equal Protection Clause. As the panel 
explamed m New Burnham Prame Homes v. Village of Burnham:260 
''Discrimmation based merely onzndivzdual, rather than group, reasons will 
not suffice."261 
The Supreme Court has smd precisely the same thmg m its "selective 
enforcement" or "selective prosecution" cases, which, agam, are nowhere 
mentioned m 0/ech. "Selective enforcement" IS typically a defense rrused 
to a crunmal prosecution, the argument bemg that the prosecutor has 
smgled out the mdiVIdual for differential treatment-prosecution-while 
cases agamst others slillilarly situated to the defendant have not been 
255 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding 
Massachusetts law constdermg veterans for state ctvil servtce positions ahead of 
non-veterans because purpose of the law was not to exclude women). 
256 Id. 
257 !d. at 279 ( emphasts added). 
258 See Futerruck v. Sumpter Townslup, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996). 
259 See supra note 25 and accompanymg cases. 
260 New Burnham Prame Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
261 Id. at 1481. 
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pursued.262 In Oylerv. Boles, 263 the Supreme Court reJected plamtiff' s chum 
that he was selectively prosecuted under a repeat offender statute. The 
Court stated: 
[T]he conscious exerciSe of some selectivity m enforcement IS not m itself 
a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics m thts case 
mtght unply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the 
selection was deliberately based upon an unJustifiable standard such as 
race, religzon, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds 
supporting a finding of a derual of equal protection were not alleged. 264 
Thus, m order to prove a claun of selective enforcement, a defendant must 
demonstrate that the prosecutor decided to pursue hun because of his 
membership m an Identifiable group, his holding of particular religious 
bellefs, or some other arbitrazy "classification" based on an illegitimate 
charactenstic. 
In Wayte v. United States,265 the Court elaborated further on the 
confines of the selective enforcement defense. In W ayte, petitioner was 
mdicted for failure to register with the Selective Service System.266 He 
moved to dismiss the mdictment, claiming that the Selective Service's 
policy of investigating and refernng for prosecution only those who were 
''vocal" opponents of the regiStration program VIolated the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee of equal protection.267 In response, ''the district court 
dismiSsed the mdictment on the ground that the Government had failed to 
rebut petitioner's pnma facie case of selective prosecution. "268 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 269 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding 
that m order to prevail on a selective prosecution claun the defendant must 
262 For a discuss10n of the defense of selective prosecution, see Karl S. Coplan, 
Rethmlang Selective Enforcement zn the First Amendment Context, 84 COLUM. L. 
REv. 144 (1984). 
263 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
264 !d. at 456 (emphasiS added) (citations omitted). 
265 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
266 Id. at 603. 
u,, Id. at 604. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contam an Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it does contam an equal protection component See Bolling v 
Sharpe, 347U.S. 497,499 (1954) ( explammgthat "the concepts of equal protection 
and due process, both stemmmg from our Amencan Ideal of farrness, are not 
mutually exclusive"). 
268 Wayte, 410 U.S. at 604-05 (footnote omitted). 
u,g Id. at 606. 
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demonstrate that the prosecution was "deliberately based upon an 
unJustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification 
. mcluding the exerc1se of protected statutory and constitutional 
nghts."270 Thus, m addition to demonstrating an Impermissible classifica-
tion, defendant may also prevail on a selective prosecution claim if he can 
show that lns prosecution v10lates ''protected statutory or constitutional 
nghts," such as the exercise of First Amendment free speech nghts. 
The W ayte Court found it "appropnate to JUdge selective prosecution 
clalms according to ordinary equal protection standards."271 The Court cited 
Feeney for the proposition that defendants must demonstrate that the 
government official was motivated by an mtent to discnmmate based upon 
an illegitimate group charactenstic.272 As the Supreme Court held more 
than one hundred years ago m Yick Wo v. Hoplans,273 a defendant may 
demonstrate that the admmlstration of a cnmmal law Is "directed so 
exclus1vely agamst a particular class of persons . with a mmd so unequal 
and oppressive" that the system of prosecution amounts to "a practical 
derual" of equal protection of the law.274 What was true when Yick Wo was 
decided 1s no less true today· ordinary equal protection standards forb1d 
illegitimate classifications, but they do not speak to mdiVldual chums of 
unfarr treatment. At least, that was the understanding pnor to 0/ech. 
Finally, as further demonstration that a class cannot be defined merely 
by the discnmmation itself, the Supreme Court has grafted a class-based 
animus requrrement onto certam federal c1vil nghts laws. The sUfVlvmg 
vers10n of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, for example, prohibits 
conspiracies "for the purpose of depnvmg, either directly or mdirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 1aws.'ms The 
Supreme Court has held that an actionable consp1racyundertlns proVIsion 
must eVIdence "some raCial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, mVIdiously 
discnmmatory animus behmd the conspirators' action."276 As the Court 
explamed m Bray v. Alexandna Women's Health Clime, m it was only by 
270 Id. at 608 (citations and mtemal quotations omitted). 
211 Id. 
272 ld. at 608-09. 
273 Yick Wo v. Hopkms, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
274 Id. at 373 (emphasts added). 
275 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (2000). 
276 Griffin v. Breckenndge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) ( emphasts added) (holding 
that"§ 1985(3) does not requrre state action but reaches pnvate consprractes • 
that are auned at mvtdiously discnmmatory depnvations of the equal enJoyment 
of nghts secured to all by law"). 
277 Bray v. Alexandna Women's Health Clime, 506 U.S. 263 (1992). 
2000-2001] "CLASSES OF ONE" 117 
limiting the c1vil nghts statute to race or other class-based amm.us that the 
Court could av01d "interpreting [the Act] as a general federal tort law."278 
While the scope of the "other'' class-based category remams unsettled, it 
1s clear that actions under the statute allegmg a Vlolation of equal protection 
must be based upon mVldious class ammus and cannot consist solely of 
mdividual complamts ofunfarr treatment.279 
Contrary to Olech, the notion of classes created with reference to 
definmg group charactenstics has been a critical concept m equal 
protection Junsprudence from the begmrung. The framers and ratifiers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment sought to protect the class of newly freed 
slaves from the Black Codes.280 The Supreme Court's Junsprudence 
reaffirmed the framers' bedrock, and expanded the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause to cover any classification of citizens utilized by the 
government to serve its ends. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
referees group conflicts-between men and women, nch and poor, and 
long-standing residents and newly established busmesses-andadjusts the 
level of scrutiny it applies based upon the group charactenstic the 
government relies upon m makmg the classification. Until Olech, it was 
farrly clear that the Equal Protection Clause could not be mvoked to 
adjudicate mdiVldual claimS of unfarr treatment. As the Court stated m 
Plyler v. Doe:281 "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was mtended to work 
nothmg less than the abolition of all caste-based and mVldious class-based 
legtslation."282 Thus, while all laws classify, it IS not accurate to state that 
there IS always a class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. There 
are no castes of one. 
C. Separation of Powers and the L1mits of Judic1al Revzew 
There are three fundamental objections to permitting the federal courts 
to referee mdiVldual clmms of mistreatment under standard equal 
278 Id. at 268 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). In Bray, the Supreme Court 
held that§ 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action agamst persons 
obstructing access to abortion climes. Id. 
279 Justice Souter, for example, contends m hts opm10n m Bray that the other 
"class-based" category of § 1985(3) IS not limited to race or like classes, but 
extends as well to other legiSlative classifications subject to "rational bastS" review 
under the Court's equal protection Junsprudence. See ld. at 295-96 (Souter, J., 
concumng m part and dissenting m part). 
280 See discussiOn supra Part ill. 
281 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
282 Id. at213. 
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protection doctrine. First, "class of one" cases, or at least those shorn of 
any requrrement that plamtiff demonstrate a campmgn of retaliation or 
other mtent to mJure, proVIde no mediating prmc1ple for the decision-
maker to employ. Second, as the Sixth Circuit stated m Futemzck, "[t]he 
sheer number of possible cases 1s discouragmg."283 Third, if there 1s to be 
a referee m cases ofunfarr or arbitrary treatment at the hands of state and 
local admmlstrators, that task ought to fall to the state courts, who should 
Judge the dispute under prmc1ples of state law. 
The Equal Protection Clause by itself proVIdes no workable test for 
determmmg whether there has been a VIolation of one's equal protection 
nghts. It has become the responsibility of the courts and commentators to 
fashion some rule of dec1s1on to be applied when the clause 1s mvoked. We 
rely on what Professor Piss long ago called "mediating prmc1ples" 
-mediating because they '"stand between' the courts and the Constitu-
tion" and "give meanmg and content to an Ideal embodied m the text."284 
However, as demonstrated, none of the mediating prmc1ples of the Equal 
Protection Clause-caste, stigma, process, or anti-differentiation-apply 
m the "class of one" cases.285 
Despite its obVIous weaknesses, the "bad faith" or "malice" approach 
adopted by the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits at least Imposed some 
limits on the multitude of executive actions that could be challenged m 
federal court under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, Justice Breyer's 
concurrence m Olech noted that it was only the "added factor'' of ill will 
that prevented the "class of one" cases from turnmg the courts mto zonmg 
boards of appeai.286 In Olech, however, the Supreme Court put subJective 
ill will to the side, opmmg that only arbitrary differential treatment need be 
alleged to state a clmm.287 
Olech leaves the courts with no mediating prmc1ple whatsoever. The 
Seventh Circuit had defended its ''VIndictive action" theory on the ground 
that the "loser'' m a zonmg contest could not "automatically appeal to the 
federal courts on the ground that the decision was arbitrary "288 That result, 
283 Futenuck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996). 
284 Fiss, supra note 163, at 107 
285 See discussion supra Part IV 
286 Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (percunam). 
It IS doubtful, however, that even the "added factor'' of ammus would serve as 
a significant or effective deterrent to lawsuits. If all it takes for a person who has 
been demed a benefit to state a claun IS an allegation that a public official "had it 
m for" him, we should expect such lawsuits to be more common. 
287 See zd. at 1074. 
288 IndianaStateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Conun'rs, 101 F.3d 
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Chief Judge Posner stated, ''would constitutionalize the Admnnstratlve 
Procedure Act and make its proVISIOns bmding on state and local govern-
ment and enforceable m the federal courts.,,289 
However, that IS precisely the effect of Olech. There IS now no 
executive or admmlstrative action that IS beyond the reach of the Equal 
Protection Clause. After Olech, any mdiVldual who lS disappomted with a 
local zonmg decision or, mdeed, the proVIsion of any mumcipal serVIce or 
benefit, may appeal to the federal courts for redress. The courts must then 
decide the equal protection clrum ''without any gwdance other than what 
might be thought 1mplicit m the Idea of arbitrary governmental action. "290 
In addition to proVIding no mediating pnnciple of its own, Olech calls 
mto question the mediating pnnciples the courts have relied upon to limit 
equal protection clalm8. Employment discrlmination and selective 
prosecution are JUst two examples. Under Feeney, a government employee 
who cla1ms to have been wrongfully dism1ssed may mvoke the Equal 
Protection Clause.291 Olech calls mto question employment decisions 
289 Id~ 
290 Id. Remarkably, even after 0/ech, the Seventh Circuit continues to reqwre 
that a "class of one" allege an unproper motive m order to state a clatm under the 
Equal Protection Clause. See Hilton v City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 
2000). In Hilton, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
[W]e gloss "no rational basiS" m the unusual setting of"class of one" equal 
protection cases to mean that to make out a pruna facte case the plamtiff 
must present evtdence that the defendant deliberately soughtto depnve hun 
of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated 
to the duties of the defendant's position. 
Id. at 1008. Without such a requrrement, Chief Judge Posner argued, "the federal 
courts would be drawn deep mto the local enforcement of petty state and local 
laws." Id. See also Albtero v. City ofKankakee, 91 F Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (N.D. 
ill. 2000) (holding that to prevail on an equal protection claim, plamtiff must prove 
defendants "smgled hun out'' for differential treatment m a spiteful effort to "get" 
hun); Singleton v. Chicago Sch. Reform BeL, No. OOC395, 2000 WL 777925, at 
*10 (N.D. ill. June 13, 2000) (holding that a class of one plamtiff must allege 
defendant's actions ''were motivated by vmdictiveness and spite''); Kevm v. 
Thompson, No. 99 C 7882, 2000 WL 549440, at *6 (N.D. lll. May 1, 2000) 
(dismtssmg class of one complamt where there was no allegation that declSlon was 
''vmdictive, motivated by any illegitimate animus or caused by subjective ill will"). 
291 See Personnel Adm'rv. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1978) (explammg that 
"[a]lthough public employment ts not a constitutional nght any state law 
overtly or covertly destgned to prefer males over females m public employment 
would requrre an exceedingly persuastve Justification to withstand a constitutional 
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause"). 
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allegedly based upon gender, race, or some other group charactenstic.292 
Feeney requrres that plamtiffs m such cases prove mtentional discnmma-
tion based upon some group charactenstic. However, after 0/ech, all that 
IS requrred IS an allegation that plamtiff was dismissed while others 
allegedly "stmilarly situated" were not. In other words, plamtiffs need not 
allege, or prove, mVIdious discnmmation based on shared charactenstics, 
but only that they were dismissed, I.e., "discnmmated" agamst, for no 
rational reason. 
LikeWise, the Supreme Court's selective prosecution precedents, wlnch 
mvoke standard equal protection doctnne, requrre an allegation of 
mistreatment based upon an illegitimate classification, such as religion, 
race, or pumshment for exercise of a constitutional nght.293 If, as Olech 
suggests, standard equal protection doctnne extends to every allegedly 
arbitrary decision made by a government official, an mdiVIdual may 
challenge the deciSion to prosecute without reference to any Improper 
classification. Under Olech, there would appear to be no limits to the reach 
of the Equal Protection Clause.294 In Professor Piss's words, "class of one" 
cases offer nothmg to "'stand between' the courts and the Constitution" 
and ''to give meanmg and content to an Ideal embodied m the texi."295 
To be sure, an mdiVIdual who challenges government action as 
arbitrary under the deferential "rational basis" test will be unlikely to 
292 See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, ll51 (7th Cir. 1990} (holding 
that plamtiff that alleged she was dismissed because of her gender m violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause "must show mtent to discrunmate because of her sta-
tus as a female and not because of charactenstics of her gender which are personal 
to her''}. 
293 See supra note 29 and accompanymg text 
294 The Fifth Circuit has exammed a selective prosecution clrum post-0/ech. In 
Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000}, the court held that "to 
successfully bnng a selective prosecution or enforcement clrum, a plamtiff must 
prove that the government official's acts were motivated by tmproper 
considerations, such as race, religion, or the desrre to prevent the exercise of a 
constitutional nght" Id. at277 (footnote omitted}. The Fifth Circuit further opmed 
that the Supreme Court's opwon m 0/ech did not alter the requrrement that "class 
of one" selective prosecution plamtiffs "must assert membership m a larger 
protected class." Id. at 277 n.17 That mterpretation, however, lS contrary to the 
plam holding of the 0/ech opwon, which, like the Seventh Circuit's ''vmdictive 
action" precedents, recogmzes an mdiv1dual's nght to equal protection regardless 
of any group membership or Identification. See Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 
120 S. Ct 1073 (2000} (per cunam}. 
295 Fiss, supra note 163, at 107 
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succeed. At least that IS true where the decision maker can proffer some 
legitimate reason for the action taken.296 However, the fact that a defense 
may be available m most cases does not excuse the expansion of a 
constitutional proVIsion to cover every conceivable case. The Supreme 
Court has stated that the Constitution and its amendments were mtended to 
apply to ''the large concerns of the governors and the govemed.''297 That 
mtent has been earned out m equal protectionJunsprudence by focusmg on 
classifications that have effects beyond the confines of disputes over 
mdivtdual benefits. SubJecting a plamtiff to an eighteen foot easement 
differential or failing to timely connect a homeowner's sewage line or pick 
up 1us trash, though actions that are undoubtedly of concern to the 
mdivtduals involved, are hardly the type of "large concerns" that should 
embroil the federal courts m constitutional questions. Such disputes will 
transform the federal courts mto overseers of the day-to-day conduct of 
local government officials. Further, the Supreme Court has been highly 
sensitive to the prospect of subJecting government officials to mtrusive and 
time-consummg lawsuits. In Crawford-El v. Britton,298 for example, the 
Supreme Court stated that ''there IS a strong public mterest m protecting 
public officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages 
actions. "299 
In Esmail, Chief Judge Posner argued that claims of mistreatment by 
state and local officials called for a federal remedy In closmg his opmion, 
he noted that: "[a] class of one IS likely to be the most vulnerable of all."300 
Consider a person, regardless of color, who has the weight of the govern-
ment brought upon htm for no reason other than sheer hatred. As Chief 
Judge Posner further commented m Esmail: ''If the power of government 
IS brought to bear on a harmless mdivtdual merely because a powerful state 
or local official harbors a malignant antmosity toward htm, the mdivtdual 
ought to have a remedy m federal court."301 
Olech does not rest upon orchestrated campatgns of vengeance, 
malignant antmosity, or even the naked abuse of government power.302 
296 See, e.g., Wroblewskt v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir. 
1992) (stating that "[t]he rational basts standard requrres the government to wm if 
any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to JUStify its classification"). 
297 Damels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). 
298 Cra.wford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
299 Id. at 590. 
300 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995). 
301 Id. at 179. 
302 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073, 1075 (2000) (per 
cunam). 
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Rather, the deciSion extends to even the most routine of government 
decisions such as the demal of some benefit to wlnch plamtiffbelieves she 
IS entitled. It sets up the federal courts not Just as zomng boards of appeals, 
but rather as arbiters of every wrong allegedly committed by a local 
admlmstrator. Every appeal m the zomng context, for example, necessarily 
mvolves some allegation that the board exceeded, abused, or distorted its 
legal authority. The breadth of the equal protection doctnne the Supreme 
Court accepted as settled m Olech IS disconcerting.303 
A weak or ambiguous mediating prmciple will mvite lawsuits. The 
Sixth Circuit is not the only court concerned about the "sheer number of 
possible cases"304 likely to be spawned by the "class of one" precedents. 
The Seventh Circuit voiced its own concerns m Olech, stating that "[ o ]f 
course [they were] troubled, as was the distnct JUdge, by the prospect of 
tummg every squabble over mumcipal services, of wlnch there must be 
tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, mto a federal constitutional 
case."305 It IS not hyperbole to suggest that tlns will be precisely the effect 
of Olech. A plamtiff need only artfully plead m the complamt that an 
official acted arbitrarily or rrrationally m order to cause that official to 
appear and defend agamst the allegations. 
Perhaps even more troubling than the burdens posed by the "class of 
one" cases IS the federalization of these local disputes between citizens and 
303 It was entirely unnecessary m Olech to create a broad new remedy m federal 
court for every local wrong. Esmail and other classes of one already have federal 
constitutional remedies at therr disposal. First, under the W ayte dects1on, ifEsmail 
had alleged that the government official sought to "get'' htm because ofhis exercise 
of First Amendment nghts (a clatm Esmail did not, but could have, made), he 
would have stated a valid selective enforcement clatm. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178. 
Thus, at least where the plamtiff is exerciSmg a constitutional nght at the time of 
thevmdictive action, he may mvoke the selective enforcement precedents. Further, 
the Due Process Clause ts the provision that polices fatmess between the state and 
the mdivzdual dealing with the state, regardless of how other mdividuals m the 
same situation may be treated. See supra Part VI. The approach developed m those 
cases limits actionable executive action to egregious or outrageous behavtor, and 
I argue that "class of one" equal protection clatms, if they are to be permitted, 
ought to be similarly limited. 
304 Futerruck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996). 
305 Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), ajf'd 
per cunam, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). See also Hilton v. City ofWheeling, 209 F.3d 
1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (warnmg that without a mediating pnnciple, ''the 
federal courts would be drawn deep mto the local enforcement of petty state and 
local laws"). 
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therr government officials. On this pomt the words of the Seventh Circuit 
m Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n bear repeating: 
The concept of equal protection IS trlVlalized when it IS used to subJect 
every deciSion made by state or local government to constitutional review 
by federal courts. To decide IS to choose, and ordinarily to choose 
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester, 
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest 
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the deciSion 
was arbitrary and an arbitrary deciSion treats likes as unlike and therefore 
derues the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the 
AdmmiStrative Procedure Act and make its provisions bmding on state 
and local government and enforceable m the federal courts. The 
review of such a deciSion not clazmed to violate some other source of 
constitutional obligation such as the free speech clause of the. First 
Amendment IS not the proper busmess of the federal JUdiciary, wluch 
would be operating without any guidance other than what might be 
thought unplicit m the Idea of arbitrary governmental action.306 
It would be difficult to better articulate the pnmary obJections to makmg 
the "class of one" cases the provmce of the federal JUdiciary 
The federal courts are not the proper fora m winch to litigate purely 
local disputes. That IS particularly so when the pnncipal question posed IS 
whether the regulator has acted arbitrarily. There are state laws and 
procedures upon which to base such a clrum. Arbitrary government action 
Is prohibited and subject to mJunction under the common law, and most 
states have admimstrative procedure acts oftherr own.307 Thus, there IS no 
compelling reason for the federal JUdiciary to msert itself into the day-to-
day conduct of local government officials. As the Futemwk court 
explamed: 
Those affected by the unfiur regulator have recourse to the state political 
processes that appomted that regulator m the frrstplace. State courts or the 
state constitution may provide protection. • Absent a breakdown m the 
state's normal political process that unfrurly affects a protected group or 
306 Indiana StateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996). 
307 See, e.g., Arnold v. Engelbrecht, 518 N.E.2d 237,239 (Ill. 1987) (holding 
that discretionary acts of public official which are arbitrary and capnc10us are 
subject to mJunctive relief). 
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the exercise of constitutional nghts, we can and should trust states to 
police adequately therr own processes.308 
In.Esmail, the Seventh Circuit asserted, without citation to any authority or 
example, that "[a]lthough the courts oflllinms seem to have been perfectly 
ready, willing, andabletoprotectEsmail agamstMayor Macrane, powerful 
state or local officials are not infrequently able to overawe state or local 
courts."309 To accept that assertion as constitutional doctnne lS to make 
every matter of state politics the domam of the federal JUdiciary Th.ts 
underestimates anddemgrates the state andlocaljudicianes, who ought not 
be pushed aside m order that federal constitutional doctnne may be 
unnecessarily expanded. 
It IS rromc that the Supreme Court, which of late has emphasiZed 
principles of federalism and has limited access to federal courts, would 
mvite countless clmms allegmg that the federal constitution has been 
VIolated by local and state government officials.310 In light of its mterpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause, as discussed in the final Part of this Article, 
it IS surpnsmg that the Court did so. 
VI. EXPOUNDING A CONSTITUTION-8UBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, mdiVIdual clmms of mistreatment 
should be put to one side; yet, if they are to be permitted under Olech, the 
courts will need a mediatingpnnctple to apply, lest the federal constitution 
swallow whole state processes for adjudicating allegations of executive and 
adtmmstrative misconduct. A constitutional standard already eXIsts to test 
indiVIdual clmms ofarbitraryexecutiveaction. That standard has its ongms 
m the area of substantive due process, and it permits relief from allegedly 
arbitrary government action only m the rarest of crrcumstances. In that 
308 Futemzck, 78 F.3d at 1059. 
309 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995). 
310 See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bel, 
527 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1999) (reJecting unplied waiver as a basiS for abrogating 
states' sovereign Immunity and·holding that any waiver of sovereign Immunity by 
a state must be express); Alden v. Mmne, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (holding that 
"our federalism" requrres that Congress treat states m a manner mdicative of therr 
status as residuary sovereigns); Semmole Tribe ofFla. v. Flonda, 517 U.S. 44, 72 
(1996) (stating that"[ e ]ven when the Constitution vests m Congress complete law-
makmg aiithority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
Congressional authonzation of suits by pnvate parties against unconsenting 
states"). 
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respect, it stands m stark contrast to the "class ~f one" approach under 
Olech. 
' A. Substantive Due Process-The Consczence-Shockmg Standard 
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has mterpreted the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,311 not the Equal Protection 
Clause, as the constitutional guarantee "intended to secure the zndivzdual 
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."312 Recently, the 
Court explamed m County of Sacramento v. Lewzs313 that "[w]e have 
emphasiZed time and agam that '[t]he touchstone of due process IS 
protection of the mdiVIdual agamst arbitrary action of government.' "314 
Indeed, the core concept of due process IS protection of the mdiVIdual 
agamst arbitrary action. Tins IS true whether the challenge IS to the demal 
of fundamental procedural farmess or, as the Lewzs Court stated, "in the 
exercise of power without any reasonable JUstification m the semce of a 
legitimate governmental obJective."315 It IS with the lattercrrcumstancethat 
the so-called "substantive due process" doctrine IS concerned. InLewzs, the 
Supreme Court held that a police officer's actions durmg a high-speed 
chase did not VIolate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
because the officer's conduct did not "shock the conscience."316 In an 
attempt to giVe content to the "shocks the conscience" standard, the Court 
stated that "conduct mtended to mjure m some way unJustifiable by any 
311 The Due Process Clause provxdes m part: "No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abndge the pnvileges or nnmunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State depnve any person or life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
312 Hurtado v. Califorrua, 110 U.S. 516,527 (1884) (emphasxs added). In Ross 
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), then Justice Rehnquxst distinguished the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses by explammg that "'Due process' emphasxzes 
fauness between the State and the mdivzdual dealing with the State, regardless of 
how other mdivxduals m the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on 
the other hand, emphastzes disparity m treatment by a State between classes of 
mdivzduals whose situations are arguably mdistinguxshable." Id at 609 ( emphasxs 
added). 
313 County of Sacramento v. Lewxs, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
314 Id. at845 (quotingWolffv.McDonnell,418U.S. 539,558 (1914)).Seealso 
Danxels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (''The touchstone of due process xs 
protection of the mdivxdual agamst arbitrary action of government"). 
315 Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 846. 
316 Id. at 833. 
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government mterest IS the sort of official action most likely to nse to the 
conscience-shockmg level."317 
Due process m its substantive sense limits what the government may 
do both m its legislative and executive capacities. However, m Lewzs the 
Supreme Court held that the "critena to Identify what IS fatally arbitrary 
differ depending on whether it IS legislation or a specific act of a govern-
mental officer that IS at Issue."318 In cases mvolvmg challenges to 
legislation, courts must mqurre whether the clrumed due process mterest IS 
a :fundamental nght "deeply rooted m this Nation's history and tradition . 
and Implicit m the concept of ordered liberty "319 It 1s only executive 
actions that are subJect to the '"shocks the conscience" standard.320 
The Supreme Court's substantive due process cases mvolvmg 
executive action emphasiZe that "only the most egregious official conduct 
can be said to be 'arbitrary m the constitutional sense.' "321 The Supreme 
Court has explamed that only by so limiting the range of potential liability 
can the Court recogniZe that-as noted by Chief Justice Marshall early m 
the development of judic1al reVIew-"it IS a constitution we are expound-
mg."322 In Lems, the Court bnefly explamed its basis for cabmmg 
executive liability under the federal constitution: "[E]xecutive action 
challenges ruse a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions 
of constitutional clrums, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have 
called a font of tort law."323 
B. A "Font" of Admmzstrative Law 
The "class of one" cases324 Implicate precisely the same concerns. 
IndiVIdual clrums of executive or admimstrative misconduct under the 
Equal Protection Clause threaten to "demote" the constitution to a "font" 
317 Id. at 849 (citation omitted). The "shocks the conscience" standard 
ongmated mRochm v. Califomra, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Court held that 
the forced pumpmg of a suspect's stomach "shocked the conscience." !d. at 172-73. 
See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (reiterating that such 
conduct "shocked the conscience" and was so "brutal" and "offens1ve" that it did 
not comport with "traditional Ideas of farr play and decency"). 
318 Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 846. 
319 Washmgton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
320 Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 846. 
321 Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). 
322 M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). 
323 Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 847-48 n.8. 
324 See discussion supra Part IV 
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not of tort, but of admnu.strative law. There IS no pnncipled reason to allow 
such claims to be brought readily m federal court under the Equal 
Protection Clause, while limiting the same actions brought under the Due 
Process Clause to conduct that "shocks the conscience" ons "egreg~ous."325 
Allowmg clauns of rrrational or arbitrary executive and admnu.strative 
action to be brought m federal court by classes of one under traditional 
equal protection doctrine will supplant state admnu.strative law and, as the 
Seventh Circuit itself pomted out m the "vmdictive action" cases, 
constitutionalize the federal Adnnmstrative Procedure Act.326 
IndiVIdual challenges to the decisions of state and local executive 
officials are plamly the provmce of the Due Process Clause. However, if 
the Court IS to mterpret the Equal Protection Clause as reaching these 
clcums, it ought to at least subJect them to the same "shocks the con-
science" standard as it does clauns of executive rmsconduct under the due 
process guarantee. Like the Due Process Clause, equal protection "does not 
entail a body of constitutional law 1mposmg liability whenever someone 
cloaked with state authority causes harm."327 Only by treating "class of 
one" clauns m the same manner as those mvokmg the substantive due 
process guarantee can the courts limit these cases to the most egregious and 
325 To be sure, the Supreme Court has been wary of expanding liability based 
upon the "textual conundrum of substantive due process." John Hamson, 
Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV 493, 502 
(1997). Thus far, the Court has applied the standard only m cases mvolvmg 
phys1cal mJury to the plamtiff. But it IS not necessarily so limited. See Rosalie 
Berger Levmson, Protection Agamst Government Abuse of Power- Has the Court 
Taken the Substance Out ofSubstantiveDueProcess?, 16 U.DAYTONL.REv 313 
(1991) (argumg that conduct short of phys1cal abuse may satisfy the "shocks the 
consc1ence" standard). See Washmgton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) 
(explammg that "we 'ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because gu1deposts for responsible deciSlonmakmg m this 
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended'") (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125). 
But expanding the constitutional proportions of executive and admmlStrative 
liability under the Equal Protection Clause merely because it IS a more favored 
clause IS not a prmc1pled distinction. Such an expansion creates the same difficulty 
the Court has assiduously tned to avotd m its due process cases, and the Equal 
Protection Clause 1s also charactenzed by "scarce and open-ended" critena. State 
law ought not be supplanted by federal constitutional doctnne, whether the state 
law at ISsue sounds m tort or admmistrative law. 
326 See Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 
F.3d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996). 
327 Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 848. 
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arbitrary conduct, thereby preservmg the proper constitutional propor-
tions.328 
As the Second Circuit stated m a case mvolvmg a substantive due 
process challenge to a zonmg decision sunilar to that m Olech: 
Substantive due process IS an outer limit on the legitimacy of governmen-
tal action. It does not forbid governmental actions that mtght farrly be 
deemed arbitraty or capncious and for that reason correctable m a state 
court lawsuit seelang revzew of admmzstrative action. Substantive due 
process standards are violated only by conduct that IS so outrageously 
arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.329 
What the substantive due process guarantee reaches, and what the Equal 
Protection Clause ought to be limited to in class of one cases, are govern-
ment officials who abuse therr power, or "employ[ ] it as an mstrument of 
oppression."330 That standardnghtly ''pomts clearly away from liability, or 
clearly toward it, only at the ends of the [ admmlstrative] law's spectrum of 
328 From a textual standpomt, there IS no reason the courts could not borrow the 
"shocks the conscience" standard m equal protection cases challengmg arbitrary 
executive action. The text of the Due Process Clause nowhere requrres that conduct 
"shock the conscience" to be actionable. Nor does the Equal Protection Clause on 
its face distinguiSh among "rational," "important," and "compelling" government 
mterests. These are court-fashioned standards used to limit the reach of broadly 
worded constitutional provisions. It should make no difference of constitutional 
proportions whether a plamtiff challengmg executive action couches hiS clium m 
terms of equal protection· or due process, or whether these clrums create a "font" 
of tort or adminiStrative law. 
329 Natalev. Town ofRidgefield, 170 F.3d 258,263 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasiS 
added). See also G.M. Eng'rs &Assoc. v. W. Bloomfield Township, 922 F:2d 328, 
332 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that local zonmg actions viOlate substantive due 
process only if they "shock the conscience"); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of 
Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "substantive due 
process clrums should be limited to 'truly rrrational' governmental actions [such as] 
attempting to apply a zonmg ordinance only to persons whose names begm with 
a letter m the first half of the alphabet"). 
330 Davtdson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). InRabznovitz v. Rogato, 60 
F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995), the court cautioned that "routine" clrums that a zonmg 
official acted maliciously "are likely to have rough sailing." Id. at 912. However, 
the court allowed the case to proceed because, based on the evidence, "a reasonable 
Jury might well be able to conclude that there was an orchestrated consprra.cy 
mvolvmg a number of officials, selective enforcement, malice, and substantial 
harm." Id. 
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culpability "331 In that sense, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits' focus 
on ''vmdictiveness"-a concerted effort to "get" an mdiVIdual or an mtent 
to mJure hun-correctly, if somewhat unperfectly, limits the constitutional 
proportions of these equal protection clauns.332 There must, however, be 
substantially more than a smgle act of malice underlymg some routine 
admmtstrative action. 
C. The "Bare Anzmus" Cases 
Efforts to "get" an mdiVIdual through "orchestrated campru.gn[s] of 
vengeance"333 are the sort of "conduct mtended to mJure m some way 
unJustifiable by any government mterest" that 1s the target of the 
consc1ence-shockmg standard.334 It IS m such cases that federal remedies 
are most appropriate, as the machinery of state or local government has 
platnlymalfunctioned. All other cases, mcludingroutinezonmg challenges, 
or allegations of a smgle act of ill will or anunus, ought to be left to the 
state courts. Although the Court did not fully explam the 
legislative/executive distinction m Lew~s, it seems clear that there 1s a 
mediating prmc1ple at work. Legislation represents the mstitutional 
JUdgment of the members of an elected branch of government, while 
executive action tends mru.nly to consist of conduct undertaken by a smgle 
actor. Thus, it 1s reasonable to unpose a different standard on challenges to 
executive action than applied to legislative challenges. What the Court 1s 
concerned with under the Due Process Clause 1s the systematic breakdown 
of the governmental function, not random carelessness orrmstakes.335 Thus, 
331 Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 848. It lS unportant to remember, when delineating the 
bounds oftherr liability, that local and state admuustrators are called on to make 
many routine diVISions each day. As ChlefJudge Posner noted m 0/ech, there may 
be "tens or even hundreds of thousands" of disputed diVISions each year." Olech 
v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998). 
332 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to limit its "no vmdictive aetion" 
precedents to Instances m whlch there has been a systematic malfunction m the 
admm1stration of local laws, such as an "orchestrated campmgn of offictal 
harassment" Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995). 
333 /d. at 178. 
334 Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 849. 
335 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confoszons About Due Process, Judiczal 
Revzew, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L.REv. 309,327 (1993) (argumg 
that due process law ru.ms to "ensure that governmentallawbreakmg does not reach 
mtolerable levels" and that "thls • ambition lS more clearly unplicated m 
challenges to rules and legiSlation than m mdivtdual tort actions''). 
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it IS not the Isolated act of denymg an mdiVIdual a permit, even if that 
demalis based on ill will, that deserves constitutional rebuke, but rather the 
concerted effort or pattern of seekmg vengeance or retaliation agamst the 
mdiVIdual.336 Carrymg tlus distinction over to the "class of one" equal 
protection cases, it may be appropnate to apply traditional notions of equal 
protection to legzslation that smgles out an mdiVIdual or entity for special 
treatment, as tlus would constitute, by definition, a systematic depnvation 
of equal protection. However, traditional notions of equal protection would 
not apply to run-of-the-mill executive actions, but only to those, like an 
orchestratedcampmgn to pumshan mdiVIdual, that "shock the conscience." 
Among the difficulties with mcorporating the conscience-shocking 
standard mto equal protection challenges to executive action Is the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to sanction an mvestigation of mdiVIdual 
motives under traditional equal protection doctrme. In 0/ech, the Supreme 
Court did not rule out an assessment of motive, but rather declined to 
consider whether the Seventh Circuit's "illegitimate animUs" theory was 
VIable under the Equal Protection Clause.337 However, Justice Breyer 
mdicated m his concurrence that the "added factor'' of subjective ill will 
was necessary to confine the Court's holding to only a limited number of 
cases.338 Without it, Justice Breyer recogniZed that courts may well be 
presented with the question ''whether the simple and common mstance of 
a faulty zonmg declSlon would VIolate the Equal Protection Clause."339 
It IS true that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to examme the 
subjective mtent of government officials, particularly legislators, when the 
Equal Protection Clause IS mvoked.340 Tins reluctance IS based at least m 
336 See J. MichaelMcGumness &LISa A. McGumnessParlagreco, The Reemer-
gence of Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof, and 
Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV 1129, 1152 (1990) ("While a smgle mcident may 
certainly suffice to shock the conscience, perhaps the test IS more appropnately 
applied to a course of govehunental conduct "). See also Chnstina Brooks 
Whitman, Emphaszzmg the Constitutional m Constitutional Torts, 72 Qu.-K.ENT 
L. REV 661, 690 ( 1997) (stating that ''what IS special about constitutional law, and 
distingwshes it from tort, IS its concern with 1nstitutional power, and therefore with 
systenuc mJustice"). 
337 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073, 1075 (2000) (per 
cunam). 
338 Id. (Breyer, J., concumng). 
339 Id. 
340 See, e.g., UnitedStatesv.O'Bnen,391 U.S.367,383 (1968){"Thedecis10ns 
of this court from the begmnmg lend no support whatever to the assumption that 
the JUdiciary may restram the exerciSe of lawful power on the assumption that a 
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part on the difficulty inherent m assessmg the motivations of a multi-
member legislative body. But as we have seen, the Court sometimes 
mvalidates government actions under the Equal Protection Clause because 
they are motivated by bare, mational ammus.341 These ''naked preference'' 
cases support application of the conscience-shocking standard to "class of 
one'' clrums premised upon the Equal Protection Clause, because m such 
cases there IS no legitimate purpose for the acts committed. Moreover, m 
cases mvolvmg orchestrated campmgns of official harassment or retalia-
tion, a detailed mqwry mto officials' motivations may not be necessary 
More often than not, a campmgn of vengeance mvolvmg a senes of 
malicious acts will speak for itself. 
Democratic outputs should not be frequently set aside solely on the 
ground that they were the result of illicit motives.342 Indeed, although the 
Equal Protection Clause IS frequently mvoked to mvalidate state laws, the 
Court has mvalidated only a mere handful of laws based upon illegitimate 
purpose. Similarly, it may be assumed that executive conduct that smgles 
out a person for harsh or retaliatory treatment that IS conscience-shocking 
or egregious will be an exceptional occurrence. To mvalidate decisions m 
such Isolated crrcumstances does not mter.Ject the courts mto the admrms-
trative process other than under the most uruque and extraordinary 
crrcumstances, as a Judicial check on government run amok. "Class of one" 
cases limited by the "shocks the conscience" standard do not threaten to 
embroil federal courts in local disputes of all manner andcrrcumstance. For 
example, the doctrine would not reach the run-of-the-mill zonmg decision. 
Yet, a campmgn of retaliation, like a legislative classification that purports 
to deny to some group benefits afforded to all others by law, ''ralse[s] the 
znevitable znforence that the disadvantage Imposed IS born of animosity 
toward the [person] affected."343 
The ''naked preference" cases and ''vmdictive action" cases share 
another similarity. Both types of cases Implicate the process theory of equal 
protection. Chief Judge Posner posited the mghtenmg prospect of an 
wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.'') (citing McCray 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)). 
341 See supra Part IV.C.2. 
342 The Supreme Court has cautioned agamst "broad rangmg" discovery to 
determme the subjective good faith of government offictals. See Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). But it has stopped short of prohibiting 
such mqumes, relymg mstead upon the availability of early dispositive motions to 
weed outnon-meritonous clauns. SeeCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
343 Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,634 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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mdiVIdual who faces alone the VIndictive force of the government.344 
Process theory plainly applies m the case of groups like homosexuals and 
the mentally retarded. We may presume that therr legislative allies are few 
or none; hence the need to scrutinize far more carefully the government's 
stated purpose m enacting legislation that disfavors these groups. The same 
can be said of indiVIduals who complam ofvtndictive or retaliatory action 
by local admm1strators engaged m an orchestrated consprracy Although 
not part of a vulnerable group that has lnstoncally been VIctimized, these 
Isolated mdiVIduals are mdeed "relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
maJoritanan political process."345 They are, m Ely's words, disadvantaged 
"out of simple hostility "346 What we should be concerned with m the 
"vmdictive action" cases IS a malfunction of the political process m a 
special form-not simply the bare animosity or naked hatred of a smgle 
admmtstrator m an Isolated mstance, but rather a concerted effort by 
government officials of vengeance or retaliation. This IS a structural 
problem, not merely a random mistake m democratic output. While it may 
be that the subjugated mdiVIdual can ultimately rally others to lns cause, a 
political remedy-removal of the rogue adm1n1strator-will be entirely 
meffectual, as the harm from the retaliation will have been done. 
The Court has exercised very sparmgly its power to mvalidafe laws on 
the ground that they are animated by an illegitimate purpose. It has done so 
to protect the politically powerless from legislative ill will. While 
concededly outside the onginal scope of footnote four of Carolene 
Products,347 which concerned mstoncally subjugated and readily Identifi-
able mmorities, mdiVIduals who face alone a campaign of vengeance are 
certainly politically powerless m the stnctest sense. If the Equal Protection 
Clause means anythmg, it IS that a legiSlature cannot enact laws that 
margmalize or subJugate a vulnerable class of citizens merely because a 
maJority of the lawmakers do not like them. Neither should rogue executive 
officials be permitted to harass or retaliate agamst an mdiVIdual out ofbare 
animUS. 
Not every random act that disappomts an mdiVIdual ought to mvolve 
the federal courts m constitutional mterpretation. But egregious cases of 
governmental oppression are another matter entirely, no matter what the 
344 See discusston supra Part ll. 
345 San Antoruo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
346 ELY, supra note 175, at 103. 
347 See United States v. Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also 
supra note 174 and accompanymg text. 
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race or gender of the VIctim. Such conduct does not "comport with 
traditional1deas of fairplay anddecency,"348 Is "arbitrary'' m the constitu-
tional sense, and IS thus properly the subJect of the equal protection 
guarantee. 
The cryptic discussion of equal protectionm 0/ech likely will continue 
to spawn confusion m the lower courts. In addition to providing some 
mediating prmciple by wlnch to screen equal protection clrums, the focus 
on egregtous, orchestrated retaliation would brmg doctrinal parity to "class 
of one" cases by re-affirmmg that only the most outrageous official 
miSconduct 1s of constitutional significance. By limiting the "class of one" 
theory, the Supreme Court would reaffirm pnor precedents like Feeney349 
and W ayte,350 wruch plamly requrre something more than a bare allegation 
of arbitrary conduct. An mdiVIdual who claims to have been discharged 
from employment m VIolation of the Equal Protection Clause still must 
prove that dismissal was due to an mtent to discnmtnate agamst the 
mdiVIdual because of membersrup m some group. In addition, clanns of 
selective prosecution will continue to be limited pnmarily to challenges 
agamst traditional group-based discnmtnation or retaliation for exercise of 
a constitutional nght.351 Allegations of arbitrary derual of governmental 
benefits will, m the mam, be the provmce of state and local adjudicative 
bodies, which will generally be far closer to the disputes and, thus, better 
able to resolve them. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the Seventh Circuit conceded m Esmai/,352 m rather understated 
fasruon, protecting angry white males from allegedly unfarr government 
treatment "is remote from the pnmary concern of the framers of the equal 
protection clause."353 That observation does not, of course, prohibit an 
348 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957). 
349 Personnel Adm 'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1978). 
350 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
351 Clauns of selective prosecution based on 0/ech would stand little chance of 
success many event Wayte IS grounded upon the broad discretion afforded the 
government m determmmg whom to prosecute. See zd. at 607 ("Tlus broad 
discretion rests largely on the recognition that the dectston to prosecute ts 
particularly ill-suited to JUdictal revtew."). 
352 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995). 
353 Id. at 180 (citing Strauderv. WestVirgmta, 100 U.S. 303,306-07 (1879), 
and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,220 (1971)). 
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extension of equal protection doctnne, as the Supreme Court's Jurispru-
dence attests. Pnor to 0/ech, however, the Court was quite careful to limit 
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit only those governmen-
tal actions based upon tmpenmssible group-Identifying charactenstics. 
0/ech brushes aside a century of equal protection Jurisprudence, but 
proVIdes no useful mediating pnnciple for federal courts to apply As the 
Court has emphasiZed, however, "executive action challenges ratse a 
particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional 
clatms.m54 0/ech fails to preserve that proportionality. By usurpmg state 
law, the Court's mterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause demotes not 
only the federal constitution, but also the state and local JUdictary 
0/ech signals to all disappomted mdiVIduals that they have a constitu-
tional clatm agamst therr government officials. The door to the federal 
courthouse ought not be opened so wide. Except m the most egregtous 
cases, mdiVIdual clatms of mistreatment ought to be set to one side under 
the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has already fashioned a 
mediating pnnciple to limit the scope of the so-called "class of one" 
clatms. Under the Court's substantive due process Jurisprudence, only those 
executive acts that "shock the conscience" are constitutionally significant 
and thus call for a federal remedy. All other cases are the provmce of state 
law Unless 0/ech IS so limited, federal courts will be expounding not a 
constitution, but a "font" of admwstrative law. 
354 County of Sacramento v. LewiS, 523 U.S. 833, 847-48 n.8 (1998). 
